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The Incidental Environmental Agency
Tara K. Righetti*
University of Wyoming College of Law
Laramie, Wyoming

State oil and gas conservation agencies are the gatekeepers to oil and gas development: as the agencies
charged with granting drilling permits, they decide if, when, where, and how oil and gas will be
developed. As such, oil and gas conservation agencies sit on the front lines in the emerging, and
increasingly irresolvable, struggle between fossil energy development and the environment. Current oil
and gas conservation regulation is designed to promote development, maximize recovery of the
resource, and protect the individual property rights of mineral owners. However, advocacy by
environmental constituencies, including surface owners and local governments, has challenged the
entrenched paradigm whereby production must be maximized at the expense of all other interests. These
efforts are pushing courts to redefine oil and gas conservation according to 21st century environmental
values. This article examines the emergent environmental regulation function of oil and gas
conservation agencies and identifies opportunities for these agencies to regulate according to their
historic mandates in a manner that is inclusive of public values.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Conservation agencies such as the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
(WOGCC) and the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC), regulate oil and gas operations for the
purposes of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights.1 No well on state or private land
may be drilled without first applying for and obtaining authorization to drill from a state
conservation agency. Exercised judiciously, this authority is a powerful force for conservation. In
the nearly 120 years since the first conservation acts and oil and gas waste prevention statutes were
enacted,2 regulation by conservation agencies has vastly limited the environmental impacts
associated with oil and gas exploration and production by limiting unnecessary drilling and
therefore limiting energy inputs associated with extraction and preserving surface resources.3
Heightened concerns regarding the environmental and climate impacts of oil and gas
development have led advocates, conservationists, voters and legislators to reexamine the
environmental regulation role of oil and gas conservation agencies. The goals of conservation
regulation and the tools available to commissions have changed little since Howard Williams wrote
his first article on conservation in 1952.4 Public attitudes towards conservation, however, are
changing. Motivated by increased awareness of and concern about environmental and climate
impacts, landowners and environmental groups have begun to demand that conservation agencies
exercise their authority to enhance environmental protections and consider issues related to the
environment and climate change in making permitting and other decisions.5 While citizens, states,
and counties attempt to compensate for what is perceived as inaction due to the lack of any
comprehensive federal greenhouse gas legislation and to respond to and prevent highly publicized
environmental and human health tragedies, state conservation agencies are issuing record numbers
of permits.6 More than ever before, commissions are asked to look at beyond the drill site spacing
unit and reservoir towards the cumulative and landscape scale impacts of conservation agency
decisions on the environment as a whole.

1

1 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce H. Kramer, The Law of Pooling and Unitization, § 3.02[4] (3d ed. 2017).

2

See, e.g., 49 TEX. GEN. LAWS 68 (1899); George A. Wilson, Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas.
A Symposium. Published by the Section of Mineral Law of the American Bar Association, 48 YALE L.J. 1470 (1939).
3

See generally David Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas Development by
Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N. D. L. REV. 759 (2009) (discussing transition “of rights in oil and gas
reservoirs away from capture rights and toward correlative rights” with the result that “state oil and gas conservation
commissions can [maximize] development of the oil and gas resource while minimizing the impact on surface and
other natural resources.”). Id. at 759.
4

See Howard Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1952).

5

This may be in response to Professor Pierce’s call to action, supra note 3, at 774–78.

6

See Kathleen Levine, Oil and Gas Companies Are Seeking New Well Permits Like Never Before, DENVER
BUS. J. (June 5, 2018); Heather Richards, Powder River Basin Inspires 10,000-Permit Drilling Battle from Oil and
Gas Companies, CASPER STAR TRIB. (May 13, 2018).
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This article considers pressures on state oil and gas conservation agencies to take an
expanded role in regulating and considering environmental impacts associated with oil and gas
production on private land 7 and looks at the emerging role of oil and gas conservation commissions
as an environmental agency. Oil and gas conservation agencies have been bombarded by protests,
requests for rulemaking, and applications to intervene in administrative proceedings calling for the
conservation agencies to consider environmental impacts as part of their permit approval. On
average, the agencies have been disinclined to take on these requests, finding that doing so would
exceed the scope of their delegated authority.
Part I begins with description of conservation law and regulations, and a brief history of
oil and gas regulation and the conservation purpose oil and gas conservation agencies.8 This part
emphasizes the historic background and rationales that underpin state conservation law. 9 It
characterizes the naissance of conservation law as emerging from a period when environmental
degradation was considered the implicit right of the industry. Part II describes conservation
agencies’ scope of authority.10 Traditionally, these functions are delegated for the purposes of
preventing waste and protecting correlative rights.11 However, in many cases, language embedded
within the agencies’ enabling statutes introduces the possibility of more expansive authority.12
These may include definitions of waste that encompass actions contributing to environmental
degradation, delegations of authority over state environmental programs, or language requiring the
agency to protect health, safety, and the environment.13 This section highlights how these
authorizations suggest an increased environmental regulatory function for state conservation
agencies.
Parts III and IV examine recent efforts to require oil and gas conservation agencies to
consider a more inclusive scope of environmental factors, including climate change. Part III
explores efforts by environmental constituencies to democratize or circumvent conservation
agencies and achieve standing in administrative proceedings.14 These efforts include requests for
rulemaking from environmental advocates, voter initiatives, and challenges to agency decisions
on the basis of environmental harms.15 Agencies have been reluctant to interpret environmental
7

An analysis of the environmental protection function of the federal oil and gas permitting process is beyond
the scope of this article. Where oil and gas development occur on federal lands, numerous laws and regulations—
including NEPA—require consideration of environmental impacts, even where development is achieved by
directional drilling into federal minerals from entirely non-federal surface locations. See, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
Permanent Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-014, Directional Drilling Into Federal Mineral Estate from Well Pads
on Non-Federal Locations, (June 12, 2018).
8

See infra notes 28–91 and accompanying text.

9

See id.

10

See infra notes 92–108 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes109–133 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 134 –146 and accompanying text.

13

See id.

14

See infra notes 147–281 and accompanying text.

15

Id.
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protection language in their enabling acts as authorizing landscape scale environmental regulation,
instead focusing on their traditional roles of maximizing hydrocarbon recovery and protecting the
personal property interests of the owners of mineral rights within the reservoir.16 As a result, there
has been a flurry of litigation considering the scope of commission authority and the agencies’
obligations to engage in administrative rulemaking or to consider broader environmental impacts
as a part of carrying out their statutory duties.17 These proceedings are at times conferring standing,
or the potential for standing, on new parties where certain environmental views have not previously
had an advocate and are expanding the factors that agencies must take into consideration when
exercising their delegated authority.18 Part IV examines attempts to reform agency authority,
including legislative actions preempting or limiting commission authority and influence by state
governors.19 These efforts have sought to restructure conservation agencies in a manner that
decreases the influence of industry voices and shift agency philosophies away from the promotion
of development towards regulation to limit environmental impacts.20
Part V considers the appropriate role of oil and gas conservation agencies in environmental
regulation of oil and gas.21 Efforts to reform conservation agencies as new environmental
regulators and may fail to achieve the comprehensive changes many advocates desire.22 In many
cases, agencies may not have the standards or expertise to engage in the fact-finding necessary to
meet these demands.23 Instead, these actions risk muddling the regulatory environment and
introducing uncertainties in an otherwise efficient permitting process. Concurrently reforms may
diminish the efficacy of conservation agencies in pursuing the public policy interests with which
they are charged.24 Commissions are not formed or equipped to investigate and answer existential
questions about the appropriate balance between environmental conservation and fossil energy
development, nor would it be appropriate for them to do so.25 However, there are opportunities
for agencies to reduce environmental impacts, prevent waste, and streamline agency proceedings
consistent with current policy directives. Structural and legal changes would further reduce
concerns of undue influence by the industry and agency dependence. This section explores
opportunities for conservation agencies to more effectively limit environmental impacts of oil and

16

See Pierce, supra note 3, at 759.

17

See, e.g., Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez, 2019 Colo. 3, 2019 WL 179037 (2019);
Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Department of Conservation, 11 Cal.App.5th 1202 (2017); City of Longmont v.
Colorado Oil and Gas Association, 369 P.3d 573 (2016); Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth (Robinson IV), 147 A.3d
536 (Pa. 2016); Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth (Robinson II), 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
18

See infra note 221–281 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 282–297 and accompanying text.

20

Id.

21

See infra notes 310–315 and accompanying text.

22

Id.

23

See id.

24

See infra notes 299–309 and accompanying text.

25

See infra notes 299–315 and accompanying text.
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gas development, arguing that such actions must be tailored to compliments the agencies existing
authority and expertise.26
Pressure on conservation agencies, counties, local governments, and other administrative
bodies involved in permitting oil and gas operations is likely to increase. Societal and economic
changes have increased awareness of and concern for the environmental externalities associated
with oil and gas development. Meanwhile, the number of wells drilled and total production have
grown significantly.27 Through efforts at the ballot box, in state legislatures, and in the courts, oil
and gas conservation agencies are emerging as a new, through perhaps unwitting, environmental
agency.
I.

CONSERVATION LAW: PURPOSE AND HISTORY

To conserve means to preserve for later use. Gifford Pinchot, cited as the founder of the
Conservation Movement,28 defined conservation as both the “use of natural resources for the
greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time” and to require equal parts development
and protection. 29 Like the concept of sustainable development, this definition of conservation may
seem like an oxymoron—requiring equal mandates of preservation and consumption of a fixed
good.30 Similarly, geologic conservation in the context of oil and gas has been interpreted as
encouraging development so as to maximize the total recoverable oil or gas from the reservoir.31
In so doing, conservation advances both society’s public interest in the development, production
and the use of natural resources while protecting each individual property owner’s economic
interest in the minerals under his or her property.
Conservation law owes its origin to the reckless waste of oil and gas and environmental
devastation resulting from the unconstrained application of the rule of capture.32 The rule of
capture provides that the title to oil and gas is obtained through capture of the hydrocarbons at the
surface, regardless of whether some of those hydrocarbons may have migrated into the well from
adjoining land that is not the property of the producer.33 Actual, rather than conceptual, ownership
26

See infra notes 299–332 and accompanying text.

27

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Wells by Production Rate (Oct. 29, 2018),
available at https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/wells/.
28

ORRIS HERFINDAHL, WHAT IS CONSERVATION, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 2 (1961).

29

Id. (citing GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND (1947)).

30

See Michael Redclift, Sustainable Development (1987-2005): An Oxymoron Comes of Age, 13
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 212 (2005).
31

Williams, supra note 4, at 1156 (oil and gas conservation is more or less coterminous with “attaining
maximum production from known fields by more efficient utilization of reservoir energy. . . .”).
32

See Pierce, supra note 3, at 760–61; Williams, supra note 4, at 1158.

33

Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561–62 (Tex. 1948); Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of
Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935).

5
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of fluid or gaseous minerals requires an interest in a producing well.34 This common law rule
incentivizes the mineral owner of a tract of land, however small, to drill anywhere on the tract and
in whatever density it can manage in order to capture as much of the common resource as
possible.35 Other mineral owners and lessees within the same reservoir who experience drainage
are thus left without a remedy except to drill their own wells, a concept known as the offset drilling
rule.36 Failure of any oil and gas lessee to do so not only results in forfeiture of his property through
drainage, but may also result in liability for royalties that would have been owed had a well to
prevent drainage had been drilled.37 The result is a scarcity mindset and a development
imperative:38 capture and profit from all within your dominion, or risk losing everything.39
The early days following an oil discovery were characterized by “profligate drilling and
tremendous physical waste.”40 Following the 1859 discovery of the Drake well in Titusville,
Pennsylvania, oil and gas development experienced a frenzy where new wells “sprang up like new
shoots after rain” and which sent “land prices soaring and would-be oil men scrambling for
leases.”41 Oil was carried in whiskey barrels and wooden vats, and allowed to run out over the land
into pits.42 Forty years later, in January of 1901 in Beaumont, Texas, the Spindletop discovery
precipitated another boom following publication of a photo of the Lucas gusher and a massive
overstatement of production volumes.43 Within a month there were thirteen rigs and by October
there were 440 wells, some on “postage stamp size sites.”44 Like they had in Titusville, prices
plummeted: within a few months, a barrel of water sold for less than a cup of water.45 Surface fires
34

Pierce, supra note 3, at 762, 765.

35

See Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719 (Pa. 1893).

36
See Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa.1907); Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399
(Ohio 1897).
37

Bernard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907); Texaco Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n of
State of N.D., 448 N.W.2d 621, 623 n.2 (N.D. 1989) (citing PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 519 (4th ed. 1976) (definition of “rule of capture”)); Patrick H. Martin, A
Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 3 OIL & GAS, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 401, 425 (2017) (reprint, first published at 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 177 (1976));
5 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 865 (2017); MAURICE MERRILL,
THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES ch. 5 (2d ed. 1940).
38

See Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much (2013); Anuj
K. Shah, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Some Consequences of Having Too Little, 338 SCIENCE 682, 682
(2012) (“[r]esource scarcity creates its own mindset, changing how people look at problems and make decisions.”).
39
40
41

DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS AND THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION 24 (2011).
See Williams, supra note 4.
Judith Linsley & Jo Ann Stiles, GIANT UNDER THE HILL: A HISTORY OF THE SPINDLETOP OIL DISCOVERY
12, Texas Historic Association (2008).

AT BEAUMONT, TEXAS, IN 1901,
42

DANIEL YURGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 30 (2008).

43

Id. at 70, 115–16. See also Darren Dochuk, Blessed by Oil, Cursed with Crude: God and Black Gold in the
American Southwest, 99 J. AM. HIST. 51, 51 (2012).
44

Linsley & Stiles, supra note 41 at 131, 150; Yurgin, supra note 42, at 86.

45

Yurgin, supra note 42, at 30, 86.

6
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and explosions at primitive refineries decimated whole blocks of land, leakage and evaporation
were prolific, and unmanaged poisonous gasses resulted in the fatalities of people and animals.46
Yet, for all its destruction, Spindletop ushered in a new era of steamship companies and oil-fired
locomotives, and with it a global search for oil that continues until this day.47
Unconstrained, the rule of capture presents a classic commons problem.48 Not surprisingly,
the application of the rule of capture to early production operated to disastrous effect. It resulted
in excessive development, resource misallocation, and gross economic and geologic waste.49 The
rule of capture encouraged behavior that injured the rights of others to the common source of
supply by stranding hydrocarbon resources underground. Excessive drilling wastes subsurface
resources through the dissipation of reservoir energy, thus rendering portions of the oil or gas
unrecoverable.50 Primary production using the natural reservoir drive can result in recovery of up
to 20% of the total original oil in place (OOIP).51 If subsurface reservoir pressures are
unnecessarily depleted, more of that oil and gas will become immobilized underground and will
be unrecoverable without artificial pressurize maintenance through expensive, and energy
intensive enhanced recovery techniques.52 Thus, optimal use of reservoir pressure to maintain
natural drive for primary recovery maximizes total economic recovery and prevents the physical
waste of oil and gas. As Professor Patrick Martin writes, “[r]easonable development for the lessor
[and lessee] historically has meant overdevelopment for the country” leading to “extravagant,
wasteful consumption of petroleum and too rapid a depletion of this finite resource.”53 Where each
mineral owner in incentivized to “capture” as much oil and gas as possible through production
from its individual tract, the resultant overdevelopment and rapid drawdown of resources can have
disastrous impacts on field wide pressure maintenance.
The rule of capture also contributes to waste by encouraging rapid drilling and development
before adequate gas handling infrastructure can be developed.54 The drilling imperative – during

46

Linsley & Stiles, supra note 41 at 167.

47

Yurgin, supra note 42, at 86.

48

Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Tragedy of the Commons From Spindletop to Enron, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVT’L L. 187 (2004); Pierce, supra note 3, at 763.
49
See Patrick H. Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Responses to a New
Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV. 321, 322–23 (2015).
50

See Northcutt Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1219–20 (1938).

51

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, BULL. D-14, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CRUDE OIL RECOVERY AND
RECOVERY EFFICIENCY (2d ed., 1984).
52

U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
ENERGY,
Enhanced
Oil
Recovery/CO2
Injection,
www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/eor/index.html, (last visited Jan. 1, 2019); Klaas van ‘t Veld & Owen
Phillips, The Economics of Enhanced Oil Recovery: Estimating Incremental Oil Supply and CO2 Demand in the
Powder River Basin, 31 THE ENERGY J. 31, 32 (2010).
53

Martin, supra note 49, at 423.

54

See Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges,
100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 1009–12 (2015); see also N.D. Pipeline Auth., North Dakota Natural Gas: A Detailed Look
at Natural Gas Gathering (Oct. 21, 2013).
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high commodity prices, prior to lease expirations, to prevent drainage from nearby discoveries,
and to capture a disproportionate share of the reservoir – encourages operators to drill and complete
oil wells without infrastructure available for the capture and sale of associated gas. Natural gas
that cannot be captured, sold, or stored, is vented or flared. Not only is the natural gas commodity
itself wasted rather than put to productive end use, the pressure of the reservoir is depleted though
its extraction.
The common law has long imposed a duty upon owners of common resources not to
commit waste. Waste and its associated environmental impacts, however, are not an incidental
biproduct of oil and development, they are by design. In the early days of oil exploration, courts
upheld the right of an owner to flare or vent gas it had captured at the surface. In 1893 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hague v. Wheeler held that the rule of capture protected the
developer of a gas well from liability when it, having no market for its gas, elected to flare all of
the natural gas it captured.55 The court found that since the producer was not acting negligently or
maliciously, and since the post-capture waste did not injure the property of health or others,56 it
could obtain title to the gas produced from its land without fear of injunction or liability for
conversion.57
Concerns about waste, overproduction, price instability, and the unconstrained rule of
capture eventually elicited government intervention in the form of conservation regulation.58 By
1920, there were already serious concerns about depletion, the exhaustion of oil and gas resources,
and the need for international sources to secure a stable supply.59 Early conservation measures
took the form of statutes prohibiting certain actions that were deemed wasteful.60 These included
prohibitions on long-term flaring or allowing a well to become wild or ignite, mandates requiring
the proper plugging of abandoned wells, and rules limiting production to some portion of a wells’
maximum capacity.61 In many states these first conservation laws did not include mechanisms such

55

Bruce Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVT’L L.
899, 907–08 (2005).
56
Id. See also Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp, 163 So. 2d 406, 412 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Elliff v. Texon
Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. 1948).
57

Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 562.

58

Oil and Gas Conservation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138–40 (1930) [hereinafter Oil and Gas
Conservation]; Weaver, supra note 48, at 187; Noel F. Delporte, The California Oil-Gas Conservation Acts, 16 ST.
LOUIS L. REV. 234, 237 (1931); Thomas A. Mitchell, The Future of Oil and Gas Conservation Jurisprudence: Past
as Prologue, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 414 (2010): Phillip E. Norvell, The History of Oil and Gas Conservation
Legislation in Arkansas, 68 ARK. L. REV. 349, 349 (2015).
59

David White, The Petroleum Resources of the World, 89 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.111, 111–

12 (1920).
60

Peter D. Junger, The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 13 WYO. L.J. 1, 2 (1958).

61

Id.; Higgins Oil. Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 211 (1919); Martin & Kramer, supra note 37, at §
3.01; Norvell, supra note 58, at 364–65; Oil and Gas Conservation supra note 58, at 1138.
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as spacing or pooling to limit the number of wells drilled.62 Instead, the focus of early conservation
laws was to avoid spillage or venting into the atmosphere, rather than ensuring efficient reservoir
development.63
These rules however quickly ran afoul of the prevailing common law property ownership
principles created by the rule of capture. Regulation of oil and gas development and prohibitions
on waste limited the rights of mineral owners to maximize their ownership through capture. As
such, mineral owners asserted that state conservation regulations violated their rights to substantive
due process and resulted in a taking of their common law property interests.64 While remaining
true to the principals of capture, the Court rejected arguments that regulations preventing waste
violated the mineral owners’ rights to due process. 65 Instead, the Court upheld the state’s
conservation law as a valid exercise of the states police power to regulate private property to
protect the public health, safety, and welfare by preventing the damage that natural gas waste
would have on the public and other mineral owners.66 Finding that a legislative modification of
the common law rule of capture did not effect a total taking of the mineral owners property rights,
the Supreme Court wrote that legislative power “can be manifested for the purpose of protecting
all the collective owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from the enjoyment, by them, of
their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach the like end by preventing waste.”67
As conservation regulation proliferated, cooperation of producing states within a common
region was deemed necessary to achieve conservation objectives through stability and uniformity
of laws across common regions. 68 Thus, in 1935 Congress approved the Interstate Compact to
Conserve Oil and Gas (IOC), which requires member states to “conserve oil and gas by the
prevention of physical waste . . . .”69 The IOC significantly shaped conservation law.70 Ratification
of the IOC coincided with the passage of conservation laws in several ratifying states. Six major
producing states initially ratified the IOC, though now almost all producing states are now

62

J. Howard Marshall & Norman L. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production, 41 YALE L. J. 33, 39
(1931); J. Howard Marshall & Norma. L. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production: Two Years of Proration,
42 YALE. L.J. 702, 739 (1933); Norvell, supra note 58, at 367–68; Oil and Gas Conservation, supra note 58.
63

Nancy Saint-Paul, Summers, Oil and Gas, § 4:2 (3rd ed., 2015); Sullivan, The History and Purpose of
Conservation Law, Oil and Gas Conservation Law and Practice, RMMLF-INST 1-1, 1-17–18 (Sep. 1985).
64

See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).

65

Kramer & Anderson, supra note 55, at 912-913.

66

Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. at 209.

67

Id. at 209–10.
Id.

68

69
49 Stat. 939, 74 Pub. Res. 64, 74 Cong. Ch. 781, art. II (1935) (Interstate Oil Compact); see H.R.J. Res.
407, 74th Cong. (1935); see also Junger, supra note 60, at 5; Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1-17.
70

Kemp Wilson, Conservation Acts and Correlative Rights: Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 35
RMMLF-INST 18 (1989).
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members.71 By the end of the 1930s, Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas had
passed legislation creating conservation agencies or delegated authority to existing agencies to
regulate oil and gas production activities.72 However, it was not until later that a majority of states
adopted comprehensive conservation regulations including modern conservation techniques such
as spacing and pooling. The IOC created the Interstate Oil Compact Commission (IOCC), now the
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, as its governing body.73 In 1949 the IOCC drafted a
model conservation statute for the purposes of effectuating the goals of the IOC, preventing waste,
and preserving correlative rights.74 The model act went beyond previous conservation measures
by providing authority to create drilling units and require cost sharing between owners within a
unit.75 Shortly thereafter, Colorado and Wyoming enacted conservation legislation in 1951 and
76
Pennsylvania enacted its Oil and Gas Conservation Law in 1961.77 Today, every oil and gas
producing state has some form of oil and gas conservation regulation.78 While the content varies,
conservation regulation has developed consistent with the purposes advanced by the IOC and the
model act and “the basic pattern is essentially the same.”79
Conservation regulations have evolved to address four principal types of waste.80
Underground waste, resulting in dissipation of reservoir energy was addressed through wasted

71

See Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Comm’n, Member States, http://iogcc.ok.gov/member-states (last visited
Dec. 31, 2018) (map showing current membership in the IOC); Nat’l Ctr. For Interstate Compacts, Interstate Compact
to Conserve Oil and Gas, http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=81(last visited Dec. 31, 2018).
72

Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV.
391, 420 (1935); A.W. Walker, Jr., Property Rights in Oil and Gas and their Effect Upon Police Regulation of
Production, 16 TEX. L. REV. 370, 380-381 (1938); see also Wilson, supra note 70.
73

IOC, art. VI.

74

Barth P. Jiggs Walker, Discussion: A Model Oil and Gas Conservation Law, 26 TUL. L. REV. 267, 270
(1952); Junger, supra note 60, at 5 (citing Legal Committee, IOCC, A Form of an Oil and Gas Conservation Statute
(Interstate Oil Compact Comm’n adopted 1949, amended 1950).).
75

Thomas A. Daily, Rules Done Right: How Arkansas Brought its Oil and Gas Law into a Horizontal World,
68 ARK. L. REV. 259, 260 (2015).
76

See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-60-10—130; WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-101—28.

77
Mitchell, supra note 58, at 397-398; see Oil and Gas Conservation Law, Act of July 25, 1961, P. L. 825,
No. 359 (codified at 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 401 to 419 (West 1996)).
78

See Saint-Paul, supra note 63, at § 4:2.

79

Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1–18.

80

See Conservation of Natural Gas and the Federal-State Conflict, Note, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 888 (1964).
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prevention measures,81 including pooling, 82 spacing, 83 oil and gas ratios, maximum efficient rate
limitations, 84 and unitization for secondary recovery. 85 Waste of resources at the surface, such as
excessive flaring, was likewise prohibited. Economic waste was discouraged through prohibitions
on undesirable uses of natural gas or oil, such as the manufacture of carbon black, that consume
limited resources without maximizing societies economic returns.86 These mechanisms included
“complete or partial prohibition of production or consumption” or prohibition of the use of
petroleum products “in nonefficient processes or inferior uses.”87 Finally, although rarely used
today, issues related to price instability and premature well abandonment due to production that
outpaced demand88 were addressed with prorationing,89 common purchase orders requiring ratable
take, and, at times, minimum wellhead pricing.90 Like earlier safety legislation, conservation
statutes have survived numerous due process and equal protection challenges arguing that
81

See Walker v. J-W Operating Co., 2012-0662 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/12), 2012 WL 6677913, at *3
(unpublished) (commission sought to prevent waste by issuing permits for alternate wells upon a finding that one well
could not effectively drain the unit, drawing upon broad delegation of authority to commission to enact any “anyreasonable rules, regulations, and orders” necessary to carry out purpose of conservation act (quoting La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 30:4)), writ denied, 2013-0185 (La. 4/1/13), 110 So. 3d 582 (mem.); see also Kramer & Martin, supra note 1,
at ch. 5.
82

See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-302(e)(2) (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116(7) (West 2018);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-909(2); N.M. STAT. ANN § 70-2-17(c); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 78.52.250(4); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-109(a); Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: State
Options in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 255, 276–78 (1986).
83

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-0807 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-17 (2018); Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 944 (Tex. 1935);
Robert E. Hardwicke, Oil-Well Spacing Regulations and Protection of Property Rights in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 99,
107 (1952) (citing Texas “Rule 37”).
84

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(b) (2007); see also Kramer & Martin, supra note 1, at § 5.01[2].

85

See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-72-308 TO -315; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3640 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 551301–17; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5.1; MISS. CODE ANN. § 53-3-7 (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-7-1–21 (2018
West); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 287.1–.15 (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-110 (2007). Notably, Texas
does not have a compulsory pooling or unitization statute.
86

Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920).

87

Williams, supra note 4, at 1155–56. Occasionally, these methods have been implemented. For example,
production and fracturing moratoria have been employed in limited circumstances to stop waste and protect health,
safety and the environment, or while agencies pursue rulemaking efforts. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL
NO. 2010-N04, NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF REGIONS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO AND THE PACIFIC TO IMPLEMENT THE DIRECTIVE TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM
ON ALL DRILLING OF DEEPWATER WELLS (May 30, 2010), and, N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41 (Dec. 13, 2010), available
at http:// www.toxicstgettinging.com/MarcellusShale/documents/exec-order-41, continued by N.Y. Exec. Order No.
2 (Jan. 1, 2011), available at http:// www.governor.ny.gov/executiveorder/2. Local governments have also imposed
moratoria on drilling and hydraulic fracturing, with limited success. See, Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State
Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS: THE J. OF FEDERALISM 403, 405 (2017).
88

Oil and Gas Conservation, supra note 58, at 1142–43.

89
E.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 3501–3511, 3701–3709 (2018); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.45, .49
(2016); see Champlin Ref. Co. v. OCC, 286 U.S. 210, 234–36 (1932); 2 Ernest E. Smith & Jacqueline Lang Weaver,
TEXAS LAW OF OIL & GAS § 9.3(A) (2d ed. 2018).
90

Smith & Weaver, supra note 89, at § 9.3(A).
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regulations to curb waste and protect correlative rights unlawfully restrict the profitable uses to
which private property can be applied. In a series of cases the US Supreme Court has upheld these
limitations based on state interests in preserving natural resources, assuring delivery of oil and gas
to the public, and protecting the correlative rights of owners within the pool. As the Court wrote
in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co, “It is now undeniable that a state may adopt
reasonable regulations to prevent economic and physical waste of natural gas.”91

II.

THE ROLE OF STATE OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION AGENCIES

A. Statutory Authority and Jurisdiction
State regulation of oil and gas is delegated by statute to oil and gas conversation agencies.92
Despite this broad authority conservation agencies are not empowered to act on all matters related
to oil and gas development. For example, conservation agencies cannot adjudicate title disputes,93
contract rights,94 tort claims,95 or consider violations of antitrust laws.96 In order for a conservation
agency to have jurisdiction to resolve a dispute, issue an order, or grant a permit, that authority
must have been lawfully delegated to it97 with appropriate standards for delegation98 and not be
preempted by other law.99 Thus, oil and gas regulatory agencies are both limited and empowered
91

Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185 (1950). This proposition has recently
been challenged in Colorado. See Wildgrass Oil and Gas Committee v. State of Colorado, Case 1:19-cv-00190-WYD
(U.S. Dist. Colo 2019).
92

PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE JURISDICTION OF STATE OIL AND GAS COMMISSION OIL AND GAS
CONSERVATION LAW AND PRACTICE 3-1, 3-4– 3-5 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1985); see, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1.
93
Martin, supra note 92, at 3-10 (citing Sun Oil v. Railroad Commission 390 S.W. 2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Austin 1965)).
94

Id. (citing Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 241 So. 2d 911, 912 (La. 1970); Amerada Petroleum
Corp. v. RRC, 395 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1965)).
95

Id. (citing Kingwood Oil Co. v. Hall-Jones Oil Corp., 396 P.2d 510 (Okla. 1964); Foree v. Crown Cent.
Petroleum Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1968)).
96

Id. (citing Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 382 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964)); Michael J. Wozniak & Jamie L. Jost, Horizontal Drilling: Why It’s Much Better to “Lay Down” Than
to “Stand Up” and What is an “18° Azimuth” Anyway?, 57 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 11-1, 11-10 to 11-12 (2011).
97

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Martin, supra note 92, at 3-5 — 3-8.

98

See Morris D. Forkosch, A Treatise on Administrative Law § 68 (1956).

99

See, e.g., Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Seggos, 288 F. Supp. 3d 530, 539 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (“states are
preempted from independently enforcing [Section 401 Clean Water Act certification] standards through the denial of
state permits”); Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (“the Clean Water and Coastal
Zone Management Acts are notable in effecting a federal-state partnership to ensure water quality and coastal
management around the country, so that state standards approved by the federal government become the federal
standard for that state”); ANR Pipeline Co. v. OCC, 860 F.2d 1571, 1582 (10th Cir. 1988) (OCC Order No. 281285
asserted that regulation of interstate pipelines was within its jurisdiction based on the state’s ratable take statute and
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by their statutory delegations of authority. The agency may not act outside the areas where it has
been empowered to act, whether that authority remains with the state or has been delegated to
another agency.100 For example, in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. WOGCC, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming invalidated the WOGCC’s decision that a new tertiary production project was not
entitled to a 2% severance tax exemption on the basis that the statute creating the tax exemption
included a five-year limitation.101 Although the WOGCC had the authority to certify tertiary
recovery projects, the court found that the commission had “no authority to base its decision on
tax matters” and had “invaded an area in which it had no statutory right” since the state legislature
had delegated “the construction of any statute affecting the assessment, levying, and collection of
taxes” to the State Board of Equalization.102
State oil and gas conservation statutes provide for the establishment of a regulatory agency
and delegation of authority to regulate oil and gas.103 Consistent with their delegated “quasilegislative”, “quasi-judicial,” and enforcement powers, conservation agencies engage in diverse
functions including rulemaking, entering orders such as pooling orders, conducting investigations,
fact finding, and applying sanctions or levying civil penalties.104 This broad authority, combined
with specific mandates and policy directives, has served as the basis for commission regulation of
the manner and location of production, the technical aspects of production, and the preemption of
conflicting local land use regulations.105 For instance, state oil and gas conservation agencies
derive their authority to regulate for hydraulic fracturing from their respective enabling acts.106
The conservation agency is required to fulfill these delegated duties consistent with the public
was necessary to prevent waste and protect correlative rights); Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Summit
Cnty., 199 P.3d 718, 723 (Colo. 2009) (citing State Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1004 (Colo. 1994));
Gulf Oil Corp. v. WOGCC, 693 P.2d 227, 238 (Wyo. 1985) (finding “find no intent by Congress to exclude states
from regulating mining activities on federal land so as to safeguard environmental values”). See also Alexandra B.
Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1653,
1673 (2008).
100

See Gage v. RRC, 582 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. 1979); Larsen v. WOGCC, 569 P.2d 87, 90 (Wyo. 1977);
Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. OCC, 532 P.2d 419, 422–23 (Okla. 1975) (citing H.F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 19
P.2d 347, 350 (Okla. 1933)); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. COGCC, 284 P.2d 242, 246–47 (Colo. 1955).
101

See Kerr-McGee v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Com’n, 903 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1995).

102

Id. at 544–45.

103

See, e.g., COLO. REV STAT. ANN. § 34-60-105 (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-6 (West 2018);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 52 (West 2018); 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 405 (West 2018); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 81.051 (West
2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-104 (West 2018).
104

See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-104 (West 2018); McGowan v. Mississippi State Oil & Gas Bd., 604
So.2d 312 (Miss. 1992); see also Martin, supra note 92, at 3-5.
105
These grants of authority have also cited preemption of local government rules that conflict with state
regulations, see, City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil and Gas Association, 369 P.3d 573 (2016).
106

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34–60–102(1)(b) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-201 (West
2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-11 (West 2018); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 86.082 (West); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
30-5-104 (West 2018). Each agency enabling act provides several general requirements to address oil and gas
production, applicable to both conventional and hydraulically fractured wells. Some relevant provisions common to
most acts include bonding, permitting, well location, waste disposal, and strata sealing. William J. Brady & James P.
Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the Federal
Government and Varying State Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 63 (2012).
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purposes as established by the legislature.107 These purposes are principally the prohibition of
waste, the protection of correlative rights, and the conservation and efficient development and
production of oil and gas.108
1. Preventing Waste
All state conservation statutes include some form of a prohibition on waste, though
statutory definitions differ.109 Texas and Wyoming, for example, limit definitions of waste strictly
to physical waste—the spillage of oil and gas or dissipation of reservoir energy resulting in the
stranding of oil and gas underground.110 Wyoming’s legislature expressly excluded economic
waste from its consideration when it rejected language that would have permitted its commission
to consider as waste “the drilling of wells not reasonably necessary to effect an economic
maximum ultimate recovery of oil and gas from a pool.”111 Similarly, Texas does not authorize its
commission to consider economic waste, instead treating the drilling of unnecessary wells as “a
political virtue, not a sin.”112 Other states, like Utah, define waste more expansively to include the
drilling of unnecessary wells to recover the same resource, thus resulting in an inefficient
allocation of capital.113 This waste, called “economic waste,” results in increased costs of
production, higher costs to the consumer, and unnecessary consumption of surface resources. Still
other states include “market demand waste,”114 the abuse of correlative rights,115 or the burning of
natural gas for uses deemed wasteful, such as the manufacture of carbon black.116
In limited situations, waste may also be defined as an otherwise lawful activity that would
result in undue environmental degradation. Wyoming’s statute prohibiting the waste of gas through
flaring provides that:

107

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:4(A); see also Martin, supra note 92, at 3-5.

108
See Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 223 (Wyo. 1994); Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc.,
830 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Colo. 1992); Larsen v. WOGCC, 569 P.2d 87, 89–90 (Wyo. 1977).
109

See LA. STAT. ANN § 30:31 (1950); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 86.2, 86.3 (West 2018); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 40-6-2(27) (West 2018).
110

TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.046(6) (1995) (defining waste as “physical waste or loss incident to or
resulting from drilling, equipping, locating, spacing or operating a well or wells in a manner that reduces or tends to
reduce the total ultimate recovery of oil and gas from any pool.”).
111

Larsen v. WOGCC, 569 P. 2d 87, 92–93 (Wyo. 1977) (quoting proposed statutory language that was not
ultimately enacted); see generally Houston G. Williams & George M. Porter, Practice Before the Wyoming Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission, 10 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 403 (1975).
112

See JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL
LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL POLICIES (2013).
113

UTAH CODE. ANN. § 40-6-2(27) (2017).

114

MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 319.2 (1), 319.5 (4) (1948).

115

ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-102 (2005).

116

See Saint-Paul, supra note 63, at § 4:38.
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it shall be unlawful to allow or permit such natural gas to pollute or contaminate
the atmosphere to such an extent that injury or damage is sustained by growing
crops, vegetation, livestock, wildlife, or domestic fowls, or to such an extent that
the human health, welfare, or safety is in anywise impaired or damaged.117
This approach expands on Wyoming’s general definition of waste in Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-101 and is
reminiscent of early state police power justifications on the right of a mineral owner to capture and
dispose of its property. Whereas flaring is neither per se defined as waste nor outright prohibited,118
it is considered to be waste where it results in environmental degradation or other imperils the
public interest. Agencies however have not embraced statutory prohibitions on waste as
authorizing consideration of landscape scale impacts or those related to climate change. However,
courts may expansively read waste and oil and gas conservation statutes in a manner that authorizes
agencies to prevent damage to the environment. Waste has been defined by courts as having an
“ordinary and generally accepted meaning and . . . whatever dictates of reason, fairness, and good
judgment would lead a person to conclude is a wasteful practice in the production, storage, or
transportation of oil and gas is included within the term.”119 A Michigan Court interpreted its Oil
Conservation Act’s prohibition on waste to include “spoliation or destruction of the land, including
flora and fauna.”120 Waste of natural resources, as defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, has been interpreted to include injury to animals and plants within the marine environment.
121

Ironically, despite very clear statutory prohibitions on waste, conservation agencies have
not been expected to stop or prevent waste altogether. In fact, waste has largely been accepted as
a necessary and unavoidable component of development.122 For example, flaring—the process of
combusting gas that is produced from oil wells but that cannot be immediately or profitably
captured and sold—is undeniably wasteful. However, it is widely accepted that some flaring is
necessary in order to test and equip wells,123 and the majority of state conservation statutes permit
flaring for limited periods of time to permit operators to case or tube wells.124 Further, capture of
all gas may be inefficient. In situations where the capture of casinghead gas may be so costly so
as to make recovery of the oil uneconomic, agencies largely consider such gas to be “unavoidably
lost”125 and permit the flaring of gas so as not to “waste” the oil by making its production
117

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-121 (1950).

118

See id. at § 30-5-101(a)(i)(G) (defining “waste” to include “[t]he flaring of gas from gas wells except that
necessary for the drilling, completing or testing of the well”). See also Kramer & Martin, supra note 1, at § 5.01.
119

38 Am. Jur. 2d Gas and Oil § 153 (2018) (citing RRC v. Shell Oil Co., 206 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Tex. 1947)).

120

Michigan Oil Co. v. Nat. Res. Comm’n, 276 N. W. 2d 141 (Mich. 1979).

121

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F. 2d 141, 145 (9th Cir. 1973) (interpreting 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1)).

122

While beyond the scope of this paper’s analysis, oil and gas leases and the mineral developer’s implied
easement to access the surface imply duties not to commit waste. Tort and contract remedies may be available against
lessors who unreasonably permit waste of surface or subsurface resources.
123

U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-11-34, Federal Oil And Gas Leases 5 (2010).

124

E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN § 55-102(a) (2002).

125

U.S. Geological Survey, Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas
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impractical.126 For example, North Dakota permits operators to obtain an exception from the North
Dakota Industrial Commission’s flaring rules if they can demonstrate it is “economically
infeasible” to connect to a gas gathering line or “that a market is not available and that equipping
the well with an electrical generator. . . . is economically infeasible.”127 Though one could argue
that an absolute prohibition on flaring might be consistent with some state’s enabling legislation,
with few limited exceptions, states have not imposed “no flare” rules on oil wells.128 Were a state
to do so, they would likely face claims that absolute prohibitions on flaring or waste presented an
unreasonable restriction on the mineral owner’s right to capture oil and gas and make use it
property and a violation of their correlative rights in the reservoir.
2. Protecting Correlative Rights
Conservation commissions are also tasked with protecting the correlative rights of owners
within the common pool. 129 Correlative rights refer to each mineral owner’s co-equal interest in
the common source of supply.130 The doctrine of correlative rights emerged as one of the core
justifications for modification of the rule of capture by legislative action.131 Waste by any owner
within a pool or common source of supply imperils the correlative rights of others within that
reservoir community. The protection of correlative rights and prevention of waste are
complementary functions of state conservation agencies. Without statutes prohibiting and limiting
waste, excessive use by one owner would diminish the property interests of all others. Accordingly,
correlative rights are necessary to both protecting the state’s interest in production and the rights
of other mineral owners within the field.132 Although some states have created a hierarchy that
prioritizes the prevention of waste,133 both functions are necessary to assure fair and efficient
Leases
(NTL
4-1)
(1980),
available
medialib/blm/ak/aktest/energy/ogforms.Par.32669.File. dat/ntl4a.pdf.

at

http://www.blm.gov/style/

126

The BLM’s “venting and flaring rule” discourages this practice on federal lands by requiring payment of
royalty on flared gas, among other changes. See 43 C.F.R. § 3179.7, partially stayed by Wyoming v. DOI, No. 2:16cv-00285, slip op. (D. Wyo. Apr. 4, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-8027 (10th Cir. Apr. 6, 2018); see also Bradley
N. Kershaw, Flames, Fixes, and the Road Forward: The Waste Prevention Rule and BLM Authority to Regulate
Natural Gas Flaring and Venting, 29 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL. L. REV. 115 (2018).
127

N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-06.6 (1985).

128
Bret Wells, Please Give Us One More Oil Boom—I Promise Not to Screw It Up This Time: The Broken
Promise of Casinghead Gas Flaring in the Eagle Ford Shale, 9 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 319, 325 (2014). There
are some examples of successful field-wide no-flare rules in Texas. For example, a 1934 “no-flare” order imposed by
the Texas Railroad Commission on the Agua Dulce field was upheld. See Clymore Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 13 F.
Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex. 1936).
129

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized correlative rights. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 203

130

Interstate Oil Compact Comm’n, A Study of Conservation of Oil and Gas in the United States 187 (1964).

131

Kramer and Anderson, supra note 55 at 914–15.

132

See generally Kramer & Martin, supra note 1, at § 5.01.

(1900).

133

See Sw. Kan. Royalty Owners v. State Corp. Comm’n, 769 P.2d 1, 9 (Kan. 1989); Gilmore v. Oil & Gas
Conservation Comm’n, 642 P.2d 773, 779 (Wyo. 1982); Denver Producing & Refining Co. v. State, 184 P.2d 961,
963 (Okla. 1947); Wilson, supra note 70, at 18–7.
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development of oil and gas resources. A disproportionate focus on prevention of waste could
diminish the property interests of some mineral owners, whereas an absolute adherence to strict
principals of proportionality or rights of capture would be contrary to public interests in efficient
production.
3. Administering UIC and Waste Control Programs
Oil and gas conservation agencies may also be charged with implementation of programs
in addition to the conservation of oil. For example, the WOGCC has jurisdiction over carbon
dioxide sequestration134 and the RRC has regulatory and enforcement responsibilities under the
Safe Drinking Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Clean Water
Act.135 These delegated duties may require the agency to engage in fact finding relative to the
extent of drinking water sources, the mechanical integrity of wells, or the containment capacity of
proposed storage reservoirs.136 These interests may, at times, contrast with interests in production.
For instance, an agency may be required to both protect water quality and permit wells for
hydraulic fracturing or wastewater injection – activities which could result harm to drinking water
sources. It is impossible in this instance for the right hand to be ignorant of what the left hand is
doing. Agency duties with respect to administration of these programs permit the argument that
conservation agencies’ authorization to restrict the use of private property to protect public
interests extends beyond the prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights interests and
that agency’s must treat their environmental protection obligations as co-equal with the obligation
to promote development of oil and gas.
4. Encouraging Efficient Development
Make no mistake however: despite statutory prohibitions on waste and administration of
environmental programs, historically the key aim of conservation law has been to promote
development. Encouraging the efficient and orderly development of natural resources is a critical
objective of conservation law, and one that is in direct contrast to environmental movements such
as “keep it in the ground.”137 The rule capture, though now constrained by doctrines of nuisance,
and limited by regulations to protect correlative rights and prevent waste, is as alive and well as
ever. While regulations may, at times, render specific properties undevelopable due to lack of a
legal location, conservation agencies are not empowered to block, stop, or hinder private mineral
owners from developing their property and reducing oil and gas to possession. Legislatures have
not found that oil and gas production, ipso facto, endangers the public and welfare or is wasteful.
In fact, in many states it is presumed to have a high public value, such that private property can be
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WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-313 (2016).
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TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.131 (1991).
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Id.
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Monika U. Ehrman, A Call for Energy Realism: When Immanuel Kant Met the Keep it in the Ground
Movement (April 15, 2018). Utah Law Review, 2019 Forthcoming.
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condemned to advance its purposes.138 Accordingly, the imperative to prevent of waste and protect
correlative rights is limited to the extent that those aims can be accomplished without substantially
impeding development or making development wholly impracticable.139
5. Health, Safety, and Public Welfare
A number of states including Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, and Kentucky authorize the
commission to consider public safety, health, welfare, and responsible development in exercise of
their delegated authority.140 While these statements of public purpose are reminiscent of early
justifications for conservation regulation, they also have meaning of their own. In most cases,
statutes were amended to incorporate these public values long after adoption of the original
conservation laws indicating that these duties are in addition rather than incidental to the agency’s
traditional regulatory purposes. For example, Colorado’s commission has the authority to regulate
oil and gas operations “so as to prevent and mitigate significant adverse environmental impacts on
any air, water, soil, or biological resource… to the extent necessary to protect public health, safety,
and welfare, including protection of the environment and wildlife resources.”141 Illinois and
Oklahoma provide their conservation agencies with more limited authority to intervene only when
there is an imminent threat to public health or environmental safety.142 As illustrated by a 2019
ruling of the Colorado Supreme Court, the addition of these mandates may introduce theoretical
inconsistencies and presents challenging issues of statutory interpretation that become core to
evaluations of an agency’s determination of its duties pursuant to its governing statute.
B. Judicial Review of Agency Decisions
Agency decisions, including those of oil and gas conservation agencies, are afforded
considerable deference upon judicial review. Under state administrative procedure acts modeled
after the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Model State Administrative Procedure
Act (MSAPA), a reviewing court will not overturn an agency decision absent some clear error in
the agency’s application of law or interpretation of its governing statute.143 Generally, most state
administrative procedure acts provide that a reviewing court may only set aside an agency decision
upon a finding that: the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law; the agency
has exceeded the scope of its statutory authority; the agency violates the state or federal
138

Alexandra Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 COLO. L. REV. 651, 691 (2008).

139

See Larsen v. WOGCC, 569 P.2d 87, 90–91 (Wyo. 1977).

140

ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.030(e) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-515 (1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3460-102, 106(2)(d); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.500 (2003).
141

COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(2)(d) (2013). The scope of the text is presently being litigated in Martinez
v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, see, infra, notes 122–38 and accompanying text.
142

225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725/1.2 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 17, § 52 (West 2018).

143

See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2010) [hereinafter 2010 MSAPA]. Pursuant to its own terms, the APA does not apply to state administrative
agencies. Thus, a state agency’s obligation to respond to a petition for rulemaking is governed by each state’s
respective administrative procedure act. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).
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constitution or denies a person of constitutional rights; or the agency decision was made upon
unlawful procedure.144 Courts justify this deference to commission decisions based on the
legislatures delegation of authority to the and the agencies substantial expertise.145
If the legislature has not spoken directly to the question at hand, the remaining analysis left
to the reviewing court turns solely on whether the agency has based its decision upon a permissible
reading of its governing statute.146 A court may find that an agency has exceeded its statutory
authority when its rulemaking resolves a question of law rightfully within the province of the
judiciary.147 In the context of oil and gas permitting by an agency, a reviewing court begins its
analysis with the presumption that an agency’s action was valid.148 As a result, it is challenging to
overcome the inertia of entrenched views within conservation agencies that consideration of
environmental impacts is outside of the agency’s authority and second to considerations of waste
or correlative rights. At times courts have overturned agency decisions that they lack authority to
consider environmental issues whereas other times those determinations have been affirmed.
Advocacy on this front however has presented new opportunities for environmental constituencies
to have their voices heard.
III.

REDEFINING OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION

Conservation agencies, particularly in the Marcellus Shale region and in Colorado, have
encountered new and growing pressures to exercise their rulemaking, adjudicative, and
enforcement authorities to afford greater consideration to environmental matters. This trend is
neither nascent nor should it be unexpected. Following the Michigan Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the state’s waste prevention statute as including damage to natural resources,
wildlife, and the environment, Professor Owen Anderson predicted in 1985 that conservation
commissions would play an increasing role in regulating oil and gas activities to protect the
environment.149 Since then, the economies of many oil-producing states have diversified to include
144

Larsen v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 569 P.2d 87, 92 (Wyo. 1977).

145
Murray Energy Corp. v. Div. of Mineral Res. Mgt., 2013-Ohio-4162, ¶ 14, 998 N.E.2d 872, 876 (noting
justification for this presumption, that, “[w]e recognize that the legislature has delegated certain authority to the
Commission and that the Commission has accumulated substantial expertise.).
146
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). A number of states have
adopted the Chevron approach to agency deference, or identical versions of it. See Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping
in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39
MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, 984 (2008) (“[a] survey of the fifty states' equivalents to the Chevron doctrine shows an
array of different announced standards, ranging from strong deference to an agency interpretation to completely de
novo review explicitly discouraging deference.”).
147

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 838 (1984).

148

See Larsen v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 569 P.2d 87, 92 (Wyo. 1977). In states that have closely
adhered to Chevron, courts award strong deference to agency decisions given that the action is not contrary to the
scope or purpose of the agency’s delegated authority. Pappas, supra note 144, at 985.
149

Owen Anderson, New Directions in Oil and Gas Conservation Law, 18A RMMLF-INST. 14, 8 (1985)
(citing Michigan Oil Co. v. Natural Resources Commission, 276 N. W. 2d 141 (Mich. 1979)). Professor Anderson
also anticipated increased conflicts over water pollution and local government regulation. Id.
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a greater emphasis on high-tech industries and recreational tourism.150 Despite significant
economic contributions,151 the oil and gas industry is no longer perceived as the lynchpin to some
state economies.152 As a result, public interest has shifted away from assuring the vitality of the
industry and the maximization of development. Instead, citizens and environmental groups have
pushed for more openness and democratization of agency proceedings and increased regulation of
the environmental and social impacts of oil and gas operations.
Responses to heightened public concern have emerged from all areas of government and
have had a profound impact on the regulation of oil and gas production. Legislatures have amended
conservation laws to include statements in favor of environmental stewardship and proposed
legislation to alter the scope of oil and gas conservation agency authority. Citizens have brought
proposals before conservation agencies and to the ballot box requesting increased surface setbacks
from occupied dwellings and schools and to mandate greater consideration of the climate impacts
of their permitting decisions.153 Local governments have emerged as leaders in land use
determinations associated with oil and gas and the protection of health, safety, and environmental
interests, and are intervening in proceedings within their borders.154 These responses have
culminated in pressures on oil and gas conservation agencies to exercise their rulemaking authority
in new ways and to increase the consideration given to environmental matters in implementing
their permitting authority. Where conservation agencies have refused, a frontier of litigation has
emerged, seeking to clarify commissions’ authority and obligations with respect to environmental
matters. The confluence of these cases has birthed new opportunities for conservation groups and
municipalities to influence the oil and gas permit approval and regulatory process.
A.

Before the Agency: Petitions for Rule Making

Citizen petitions for rulemaking are a primary pathway for members of public to gain
access to administrative rulemaking proceedings before a conservation agency, and may force a
reluctant agency’s hand on a particular issue. A “petition for rulemaking,” as its name would
suggest, refers to the process by which an interested person can file a proposal that a federal or
state agency promulgate a particular rule.155 Although citizen petitions regarding oil and gas are
150

Alexandra Klass, supra note 138 at 691; Colorado Profile Analysis, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=CO#1.
151

Kevin J. Duffy, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing Through Land Use: State Preemption Prevails, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 817, 834–37 (2014).
152

Id. at 834.

153

See infra notes 176–89 and accompanying text.

154

Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, When States’ Legislation and Constitutions Collide with Angry Locals: Shale
Oil and Gas Development and Its Many Masters, 41 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 55, 59, n. 6, 7 (2016)
(“[i]n 2012 alone, fourteen states enacted or refined comprehensive oil and gas legislation, which in each state
restricted local control to at least some degree.”); Nathaniel L. Foote, Not in My Backyard: Unconventional Gas
Development and Local Land Use in Pennsylvania and Alberta, Canada, 3 PENN. ST. J. OF L. & INT’L AFF. 235, 245
(2015)
155

See Off. of the Fed. Reg., A Guide to the Rulemaking Process (2011), available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf.
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fairly common among federal agencies,156 oil and gas conservation commissions were long viewed
as being closed and dealing only with “seemingly mundane well spacing and related conservation
proceedings.”157 Recently however, environmental groups have begun petitioning conservation
agencies to initiate rulemaking on a variety of environmental subjects.
Citizen petitions for rulemaking are expanding the scope of parties who are involved in
proceedings before the conservation agency. The majority of proceedings before an oil and gas
conservation agency are limited to “operators or royalty owners of land” within the area affected
by a drill permit or well spacing order.158 Whereas a party within the boundaries of a spacing unit
can protest and application or challenge a decision, a neighbor who lives nearby the proposed
drilling location or a group of people who enjoy recreating in the area could not. Although exact
definitions in state administrative procedures acts differ, an “interested person” may “include[]
any person who may be aggrieved by agency action.”159Although the citizen petition process
would not all protest of individual well location, citizen petitions are being used to ask conservation
agencies to initiate new rulemakings for oil and gas rules.
The availability of petitions to initiate rulemaking dates to the passage of the federal APA
and most state administrative procedure acts. States that have adopted the Model Administrative
Procedure Act, or a version of it, generally require “each agency to give an interested person the
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”160 Indeed, agencies at the state
and federal levels receive hundreds of petitions for rulemaking each year, while others receive
none whatsoever.161
A state agency’s obligation to affirmatively respond to a citizen petition for rulemaking—
in oil and gas contexts and otherwise— arises from the state’s unique administrative procedure
act.162 In the same way that this duty to respond pursuant to applications of the federal APA is
unclear, the duty of state agencies to respond to citizen petitions for rule making is often
imprecise.163 Although the action on the petition is within the discretion of the agency, generally,
156

See e.g., Citizen Pet. Requesting the Completion of a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(filed Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.cbf.org/document-library/cbf-misc-documents/FINAL-Petition-toCEQ-Apr-4-201176ff.pdf.
157

Pierce, supra note 3, at 776.

158

See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE ANN. § 79.23 (West 2018).

159

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-102(6.2) (West 2018).

160

See supra note 156 and accompanying text.

161
Jason A. Schwartz and Richard L. Revesz, Petitions for Rulemaking, Final Report to the Administrative
Conference
of
the
United
States
(Nov.
5,
2014),
available
at
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Final%20Petitions%20for%20Rulemaking%20Report%20%5b1
1-5-14%5d.pdf.
162

See infra notes 97—107 and accompanying text.
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Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Public Participation in Nonlegislative Rulemaking, 61 Vill. L. Rev.
759, 761 (2016) (“[e]ven when [judicial] review is available, the federal courts employ inconsistent standards to
evaluate both agency inaction and unreasonable delay in adjudicating a petition.”). See also Admin. Conf. of the
United States, Petitions for Rulemaking, https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/petitions-rulemaking-0#_ftnref8
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the agency may not simply ignore the petition and must issue a response either declining or
adopting the proposed rule within a reasonable time.164 Under the revised 2010 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, the state agency must deny the petition with explanation or initiate
rulemaking within 60 days of receiving the petition.165
Rejection of a petition may also create standing for environmental advocates to challenge
the agencies decision and ask for judicial clarification of the agency’s duties with respect to the
environment. Depending on the state statute under which an interested party petitions for
rulemaking, the denial of a citizen’s petition for rulemaking may lend standing for judicial review
on the agency’s denial after all administrative remedies have been exhausted.166 Administrative
procedure acts in states including Colorado, Montana, and Texas—for instance—grant to
aggrieved and interested parties standing to appeal petition denials, along with other final agency
actions, for judicial review.167 In Wyoming, conversely, “[t]he action of the agency in denying a
petition is final and not subject to review.”168 An agency’s refusal to initiative rulemaking in
respond to a petition is “at the high end of the rang of levels of deference.”169 However, where
refusals are on based on an agency’s assertion that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the issue, the
review process has provided opportunities for reinterpretation of agency’s enabling statues
including an evaluation of the agency’s obligations with respect to environmental protection.
The prevalence of petitions for rulemaking concerning health and environment in the oil
and gas and other resource development contexts is comparatively nascent and accompanies a
broad sweep of attempts to embolden barriers to many types of resource developments.170 Over
the last several years, conservation groups and concerned citizens have used petition procedures
to push oil and gas and other conservation agencies to exercise their rulemaking authority by

(last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (noting that few federal agencies have delineated clear procedures for responding to
petitions for rulemaking).
164

See, e.g., Larry Koch, Inc. v. Texas Nat. Conservation Comm'n, 52 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. App. 2001).

165

2010 MSAPA, supra note 141, at § 318.

166

See id. at § 506 (“a person may file a petition for judicial review under this [act] only after exhausting all
administrative remedies available within the agency the action of which is being challenged and within any other
agency authorized to exercise administrative review.”).
167

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-106 (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-702 (West 2018); TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 2001.176 (West 2018). The 2010 MSAPA also grants broad standing to petitioners on judicial review.
Id. at § 501.
168

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-106 (West 2018) (emphasis added).

169

Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

170

Experiments concerning the potential of administrative agencies to embolden environmental barriers to
development have emerged also in realms like water appropriation, where citizens and tribes have petitioned state
agencies to block new appropriations for the conservation of instream flows. See Lindsey Schromen-Wawrin,
Adopting Instream Flow Rules in Washington State: Can Citizens Jumpstart the Process Through the Administrative
Procedure Act?, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 561 (2013).
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proposing new rules.171 These proposals suggest changes to increase the consideration of
environmental impacts in oil and gas regulation and to provide more stringent rules to protect
surface landowners from the health, safety, and environmental impacts of drilling and
production.172
1. Increased Setbacks
Several oil and gas conservation agencies have seen citizen-initiated petitions to increase
setbacks from schools, homes, and other occupied structures, as well as from environmentally
sensitive areas such as streams and wetlands. Setbacks from drilling locations are a significant area
of concern to surface landowners and conservation groups alike.173 In the absence of regulation, a
severed mineral owner has no obligation to offset a well location from a home or residence,174
though there is a strong custom of doing so. While some states have codified or implied an
obligation to accommodate the existing uses of the surface owner,175 traditionally mineral owners’
use of the surface was constrained only by the bounds of reasonableness as determined by custom
and practice in the industry.176 Landowner tolerance for the externalities of drilling and production
has diminished as a result of changing social norms and increased development in urbanized areas
and on split estates.177 In those areas, the surface owner may have no interest in, or control of, the
underlying minerals.178 Thus, surface landowners in suburban areas, who have and little to no
participation in the leasing and permitting process or the economic benefits of production, are
experiencing the brunt of the localized impacts of development.179 To buffer the most localized
impacts of development, citizens and conservation groups have petitioned oil and gas commissions

171

Our Children’s Trust, Other Proceedings in All 50 States, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/otherproceedings-in-all-50-states (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (since 2011, Our Children’s Trust (among other groups) has
submitted petitions for agency rulemaking regarding oil and gas development in all fifty states).
172

See, e.g., Pet. Kids vs Global Warming to the Wyo. Dep’t Envt’l Qual. & Wyo. Envt’l Qual. Control (May
4, 2011) (seeking promulgation of rule to mandate protection of atmosphere as public trust resource).
173

See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-05 (2013); MD. CODE REGS. 26.19.01.09(G) (2018); see also Hannah
J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 797–98 (2013).
174

See Clarence A. Brimmer, The Rancher’s Subservient Surface Estate, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 49, 54

(1970).
175

See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-401 to -410; Ernest E. Smith, The Growing Demand for Oil and Gas
and the Potential Impact upon Rural Land, 4 TEX. J. OF OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 1, 6 (2008).
176

See Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1943); Christopher M. Alspach, Surface Use by the
Mineral Owner: How Much Accommodation Is Required Under Current Oil and Gas Law?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 91
(2002).
177

See Ernest E. Smith, Urbanization and the Surface Development of Mineral Land: The Conflict Between
the Dominant and Servient Estates, in SELECTED WORKS, TEX. J. OF OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. (2013).
178

See Wiseman, supra note 170, at 778–79 (2013).
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See Alex Ritchie, On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in New Mexico, 54 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 255, 297–98 (2014).
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to adopt new rules increasing well setbacks from occupied structures, schools, streams, and other
public resources.180
In Montana, Colorado, and Wyoming, new surface setback and notification rulemakings
were initiated only after citizen groups had proposed more stringent rules to the conservation
agencies.181 Regardless of whether the precise petition is accepted or denied, conservation agencies
have demonstrated responsiveness to the petition process.182 For example, in 2012, the COGCC
commenced rulemaking regarding surface setbacks following a proposal from the Colorado
Environmental Coalition.183 The contentious process resulted in adoption of Rule 604, which
creates a buffer zone setback prohibiting location of a well within 1,000 feet of a building unit.184
In order to obtain an exception from the 1,000-foot setback, oil and gas operators must have
engaged in consultation with landowners and local governments and agreed to “site specific
mitigation measures as necessary to eliminate, minimize or mitigate potential adverse impacts to
public health, safety, welfare, the environment, and wildlife.”185 This provision empowers both
surface landowners and local governments and provides opportunities for private governance
approaches to development conditions and stipulations to mitigate impacts of development.
Similarly, in July of 2018, the COGCC voted in favor of a petition brought by League of Oil and
Gas Impacted Coloradans to alter oil and gas well setbacks from schools and initiated rulemaking
proceedings that lead to adoption of a rule in December.186
Montana and Wyoming followed similar processes, but with more constrained outcomes.
In 2013, following a petition from the Powder River Basin Resource Council, the WOGCC
commenced rulemaking to modify its occupied structure setbacks to require a 500-foot setback
from an occupied structure.187 Although the new rules doubled the previous setbacks, they were

180

See, e.g., Rebuttal Statement of Colorado Environmental Coalition, et. al, COGCC SETBACK
RULEMAKING (2012).
181
See Pat Bellinghausen, Gazette Opinion: Put Some Distance Between Oil Wells and Montana Homes,
BILLINGS GAZETTE (Aug. 6, 2015); Stephanie Joyce, Draft Rule Proposes Increased Buffer Between Drilling and
Homes, WYO. PUB.MEDIA (Sept. 5, 2014).
182
See WOGCC, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPAL REASONS
http://wyoleg.gov/arules/2012/rules/ARR14-077.pdf.
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RULES (Apr. 23, 2015),
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Rebuttal Statement of Colo. Envtl. Coal. et al., COGCC Setback Rulemaking (2012).
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2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:604.a.(2).
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Id.
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Broomfield Concerned, School Setback Cogcc Rulemaking Going Forward After Logic Petition (Jul. 30,
2018), available at https://broomfieldconcerned.org/blog/author-jean-lim/school-setback-cogcc-rulemaking-goingforward-after-logic-petition/.
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WYO. RULES & REGS. OIL GEN ch. 3, § 47(a); see Dustin Bleizeffer, Homeowners Upset at State’s New
Oil and Gas Rule, WYOFILE (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.wyofile.com/homeowners-upset-states-new-oil-gas-rule/;
Lynne J. Boomgaarden, The Regulators’ Perspective on Oil & Gas Surface Uses: Managing Stakeholder
Expectations, OIL AND GAS AGREEMENTS: SURFACE USE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 11B-1, 11B-5 (Rocky Mt. Min. L.
Fdn. 2017).
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far lower than the 1,000 feet or more that landowner advocates had requested.188 In Montana, the
Montana Board of Oil and Gas commenced rulemaking on setbacks and occupied structure notice
requirements following action by the Northern Plains Resource Council.189 The Board ultimately
declined to adopt setback rules but implemented new notice requirements for all occupied
structures within 1,320 feet of a proposed well.190 Through advocacy for new setbacks, landowners
have successfully pushed conservation agencies to adopt new rules to mitigate the most immediate
impacts of drilling. This may demonstrate agency responsiveness to citizen petitions, even where
those petitions are denied.
2. Landscape Scale Impacts
Conservation groups and concerned citizens have also pressed commissions to limit
drilling activities based on the consideration of cumulative, landscape-scale impacts.191 One such
petition in Colorado has resulted in litigation regarding the obligation of the COGCC to consider
the impact of drilling on public health, safety, and welfare and the environment.192 In November
2013, a group of Colorado teens petitioned the COGCC to initiate rulemaking.193 The proposed
rule required the COGCC to refrain from issuing new oil and gas drilling permits for operations,
including hydraulic fracturing, until the “best available science” confirmed that the drilling would
not “cumulatively, with other actions, impair Colorado’s atmosphere, water, wildlife, and land
resources, . . . adversely impact human health [or] contribute to climate change.”194 The teens
argued that under Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act,195 the COGCC is tasked with ensuring
that development of oil and gas is “responsible [and] balanced” and that production is “consistent
188

See John Robitaille, Robitaille: Increasing Setbacks to 500 Feet Is Reasonable, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Mar.

29, 2015).
189

See Renée Jean, New Setback Rule Could Face Setbacks of Its Own: MPA President Says Board Didn’t
Have
Rulemaking
Authority,
WILLISTON
HERALD
(Dec.
26,
2016),
available
at
https://www.willistonherald.com/news/new-setback-rule-could-face-setback-of-its-own/article_986042d0-c7e411e6-9d51-03b516a8e3c6.html.
190

MONT. ADMIN R. 36.22.620(2) (2017). Legislation which would have reduced the notice requirements
adopted by the Montana Board of Oil and Gas were vetoed by the Governor in 2017. In a statement that confirmed
the Board’s authority to enact the rule, Governor Steve Bullock affirmed the Board’s lauded the “heavily vetted”
rulemaking process that resulted in a “compromise between landowners’ and the industry’s interests. S. 93, 65th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017); Governor Steve Bullock, “Statement of Veto” (May 8, 2017).
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Envtl. Def. Fund, Railroad Commission Petitioned to Replace Local Oil and Gas Rules Threatened by
House Bill 40 (Apr. 7, 2015), available at https://www.edf.org/media/railroad-commission-petitioned-replace-localoil-and-gas-rules-threatened-house-bill-40; Envtl. Def. Fund, EDF Calls for New Safety Measures to Prevent Oil and
Gas Explosions in Texas’ Coastal Area (Jun. 18, 2015), available at https://www.edf.org/media/edf-calls-new-safetymeasures-prevent-oil-and-gas-explosions-texas-coastal-areas.
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Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez, 2019 Colo. 3, 2019 WL 179037 (2019).

193

See In re Petition for Rulemaking Filed with the COGCC, Cause No. 1, Order No. 1-187 (May 29, 2014);
see also Blair Miller, Colorado Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Case Involving Oil and Gas Regulators,
Environmentalists, THE DENVER CHANNEL (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/politics
/colorado-supreme-court-to-hear-appeal-of-case-involving-oil-and-gas-regulators-environmentalists.
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with protection of public health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and
wildlife resources.”196 In May 2014 the COGCC unanimously rejected the teens’ rulemaking
petition. The COGCC determined that the proposed rule was beyond its authority and would
require it to “readjust the balance crafted by the General Assembly,” and that delegating review of
COGCC’s rulemaking to a third-party organization would be an unlawful violation of the nondelegation doctrine.197 The COGCC also found that many of the issues raised in the petition were
already being addressed by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment and the
legislature and related more closely to air quality than to oil and gas.198
In January of 2019, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the COGCC’s rejection of the
teens’ petition and overturned an appellate court decision that had found for the petitioners. The
outcome of the decision shouldn’t be surprising: courts frequently defer to an agency’s
interpretation of its statutory enabling program and afford an agency broad discretion with respect
to “how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its delegated
responsibilities.”199 Although the court declined to read the Commission’s order as a conclusion
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it found that the agency’s decision was reasonable in light
of the court’s construction of Colorado’s Oil and Gas Act. What is significant is that the petitioners
were able to argue for a statutory re-interpretation of the act to conform with its stated
environmental values. The court declined to find that “that the pertinent provisions of the Act allow
the Commission to condition one legislative priority (here, oil and gas development) on another
(here, the protection of public health and the environment).”200

B. At the Ballot Box
Advocates have advanced ballot initiatives to revise the authority of conservation agencies,
impose new duties on states to protect the environment, or to directly regulate oil and gas activities.
In November of 2018, voters across the western united states had the opportunity to vote on ballot
initiatives relative to energy and the environment: Washington voters considered a carbon tax,
Arizona and Nevada voters evaluated renewable energy mandates, and voters in Montana
considered restrictions on hard rock mining.201 In states with the power of initiative or referendum,
voters have sought to use the power of direct democracy to bypass legislatures and agencies and
196

Martinez v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 2017 COA 37, cert. granted, No. 17SC297, 2018
WL 582105, ¶ 16 (Colo. Jan. 29, 2018), and rev'd, 2019 CO 3 (emphasis omitted) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-60-102(1)(a)(I) (West 2018)).
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In re Petition for Rulemaking Filed with the COGCC, Cause No. 1, Order No. 1-187 (May 29, 2014).
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Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). But see Mobile Oil Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 608 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Kan.
1980); Martin, supra note 92, at 3-10.
200

Martinez, 2017 COA 37, ¶ 50.
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David Roberts, Fossil fuel money crushed clean energy ballot initiatives across the country, VOX (Nov.
11, 2018), available at https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/11/7/18069940/election-results-2018energy-carbon-fracking-ballot-initiatives.
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create new laws dictating what kind of energy will be used and produced, how to address climate
change and carbon taxes, and where energy production can occur. The “democratization of energy
law” through voter initiatives and referenda is underway,202 and oil and gas has been no exception.
Voters in Alaska, Colorado, and Florida proposed propositions to limit the locations in
which oil and gas development can occur and imposed additional restrictions on development in
environmentally sensitive areas or areas where public safety or health are of greater concern. In
Alaska, voters rejected a proposition which would have charged Alaska Department of Fish and
Game commissioner with enacting standards and permitting requirements for certain activities that
would affect salmon and other Anadromous fish habitat and which would have had serious impacts
on oil and gas construction activities.203 Florida voters conversely considered and passed an
amendment banning offshore drilling in state waters.204 In Colorado, voters responded to concerns
about development near occupied structures were heightened after an explosion resulting from a
flowline leak near an occupied structure that resulted in two fatalities in Firestone, Colorado, in
2017.205 In addition to actions by the Governor,206 cities and counties,207 and the COGCC,208 voters
also put forth ballot initiatives that would provide additional local control and increase setbacks
beyond those established by the COGCC.209 In 2018, Colorado Rising for Health and Safety
(Colorado Rising) put forward Ballot Proposition 112 proposing a 2,500-foot setback from
occupied structures.210 Like a similar measure proposed in November of 2016, had it passed over
90% of the land in some counties would have been unavailable to future oil and gas
development.211 After a contentious election season, Proposition 112 was defeated.212
In anticipation of more restrictive state and local land use regulation, including setbacks
and zoning, industry and royalty owners proposed amending the Colorado Constitution to qualify
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See Bruce Finley, Deadly Firestone Explosion Caused by Odorless Gas Leaking from Cut Gas Flow
Pipeline, DENVER POST (May 2, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/02/firestone-explosion-cause-cut-gasline/.
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See News Release, Office of Governor John Hickenlooper, Gov. Hickenlooper Directs Review of
Statewide Oil and Gas Operations Following Firestone Home Explosion Investigation (May 2, 2017).
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See Natalie Spiess, A Cause Worth Fighting For: The Battle for Local Control over Colorado’s Oil and
Gas Industry, 95 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 71 (2018).
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See COGCC, Flowline Rulemaking, Docket No. 171200767 (adopted Feb. 13, 2018).
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See Nora Olabi, Anti-Fracking Initiative Gathering Signatures for November Ballot, WESTWORD (Apr.
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losses in market value resulting from new laws or regulations as compensable takings.213 This
amendment would have provided compensation for economic losses resulting from government
regulation that reduces the fair market value of property or prevents property from being used for
purposes allowable at the time the owner acquired its interest. The amendment did not pass, but
had it, it would have provided not only avenues for compensation for diminution of the value of
the mineral estate due to city or county ordinances, but also potentially for new restraints on the
rule of capture including changes to compulsory pooling laws or rulemaking by the
Commission.214
Of the several oil and gas initiatives on the ballot nationwide in November of 2018, only
Florida’s ban on offshore drilling in state waters was passed. This may indicate that, at least in the
realm of energy, the initiative process is driven more by “wealthy individuals and special interests”
than distrust of the legislature.215 Despite this, the trend of voters looking to direct democracy to
regulate activities should not be ignored.216 Legislatures, agencies, and judges are responsive to
initiatives.217 As a result, in states where they are authorized voter initiatives are eclipsing
legislatures as powerful forces in driving public policy. Even failed initiatives can have powerful
indirect impacts on state policy. In states with initiative processes, “the threat of an initiative can
cause the legislature to revise its policy decisions.”218
C. In the Courts
Courts have played an important role in independently shaping the development of
conservation law and determining to what extent agencies can and must consider environmental
impacts in agency decisions. Courts frequently review conservation agency decisions regarding
oil and gas permitting to resolve conflicts between mineral owners, surface interests, local
governments and conservation advocates. These decisions largely concern issues of statutory
interpretation and whether an agency has complied with its state’s administrative procedure act
and other state laws. Recent decisions in Pennsylvania and Ohio indicate a trend towards affording
greater deference to environmental concerns and have affirmed the standing of individuals,
municipalities, and advocacy groups to challenge agency decisions that do not adequately consider
or protect environmental values.
1. Matters of Fairness
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In the majority of matters before a state oil and gas commission, the only parties with standing
to challenge an agency decision are parties who own a real property interest that is affected by the
agency decision.219 For example, in many states, an application for a drill spacing unit and permit
to drill can be challenged by the state, mineral interest owners within the proposed spacing unit or
within a specified distance of the wellbore, and the surface owners within the unit. These interested
parties have the right to protest an applicant’s proposal, whereas others, such as adjoining
landowners do not.
While objections on the basis of waste or injury to the protestants correlative rights are
common, landowners are increasingly objecting to proposed agency actions due to concerns
regarding health safety and the environment. Courts have upheld regulatory and common law
limitations on oil and gas development and the rule of capture to protect public safety since the
earliest days of development. For example, in People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, the Indiana Supreme
Court granted a preliminary injunction to an adjacent landowner to prevent shooting the well with
nitroglycerine on the basis that that use of explosives in a residential area might constitute a
nuisance.220 Conservation agencies, however, have been disinclined to based decisions on
landowners’ objections to the disruption and loss of enjoyment that industrial development can
render. Agencies rarely engage in separate factfinding relative to the safety, health, or welfare
impacts of the proposed activity. However, dissenting landowners are beginning to raise these
concerns in administrative processes and to appeal to courts where those concerns are ignored. As
a result, these, and other non-economic factors, may become a progressively important component
of agency decisions. 221
In one Ohio case, Simmers v. City of North Royalton, health and safety concerns featured
prominently in a commission decision relative to forced pooling.222 In that case, the operator
sought to force pool two tracts owned by the City of North Royalton after the city unanimously
voted to deny a proposed lease. The City objected on the basis of operator’s poor safety record.223
In December 2013, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources
Management issued the drilling permit and mandatory pooling order.224 The Division found that
pooling was necessary to meet the state’s spacing requirements and that an offer had been made
to voluntarily pool on a just and equitable basis.225 On appeal, however, the Ohio Oil and Gas
219
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-106 (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-108 (West 2018);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-144 (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-109 (West) (extending to interested persons
the right to be heard on objections to proposed drilling units).
220

31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892).

221

See Robertson, supra note 151, at 105–09; Alan Romero, Local Regulation of Mineral Development in
Wyoming, 10 WYO. L. REV. 463 (2010).
222

65 N.E.3d 257 (10th Dist.).

223

See id.

224
Id. Interestingly, there is no discussion of Ohio Stat. § 1509.06 (2015) which grants the chief authority to
deny “a permit if the chief finds that there is a substantial risk that the operation will result in violations of this chapter
or rules adopted under it that will present an imminent danger to public health or safety or damage to the environment.”
225

Id.
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Commission revoked the mandatory pooling order on account that the Division had not adequately
considered the owner’s legitimate safety concerns.226 The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission’s decision, holding that a commission could consider safety concerns as part of its
evaluation of whether an offer for voluntary pooling was just and equitable in light of the impact
of oil and gas operations on the nonconsenting landowner, including “the negative impact of
drilling activity on streets and other infrastructure, or the safety of a municipal water
supply . . . .”227 The Court agreed that the oil and gas operator had not used all reasonable efforts
to reach an agreement for voluntary pooling because it had not provided the dissenting landowner,
the city, with a sufficient opportunity to consider the offer and propose a reasonable alternative.228
Simmers is significant for two reasons: first, Simmers is notable for the significance it
places on the surface-based concerns of the dissenting landowner.229 While much of the case
focuses on whether Cabot had used “all reasonable efforts” to obtain a voluntary agreement, it also
looks at whether the agreement Cabot proposed was reasonable. Rather than focusing its analysis
solely on whether the city’s allocation of production was fair and equitable based on the amount
of oil and gas estimated to be under its property, the Ohio Court of Appeals takes a more expansive
view by considering safety-based concerns of the mineral owner as part and parcel of an evaluation
of the value of its correlative rights.230 The objections of the plaintiffs in Simmers are not
anomalous. A group of homeowners in a recent case filed in Colorado district court similarly ask
the court to overturn the state’s forced pooling law and enjoin application of the statute to their
interests on the basis of threats to health, safety, and the environment including “well pad and
pipeline fires and explosions; debilitating air pollution only seen through infrared cameras; well
failures and “spills” causing groundwater pollution; unregulated dumping of radioactive waste;
destruction of water supplies; permanently scarred landscapes; [and] soil contamination”231
Simmers indicates that courts may be less likely to defer to agency decisions where the surface and
environmental concerns of dissenting landowners are not considered.
Second, Simmers is significant for its acknowledgement of the unique interest of the city
as a landowner in preventing safety or other environmental harms from coming to bear. 232
Conflicts between state local governments, conservation agencies, and legislatures regarding the
regulation of oil and gas date back to at least the 1930s when the Oklahoma Supreme Court found
that a municipality was not preempted by the State’s establishment of the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission from establishing bonding for wells drilled within the city.233 Cases regarding the
226

Id.

227

Id.

228

Id.
Heidi Robertson, Get Out From Under My Land! Hydraulic Fracturing, Forced Pooling or Unitization,
and the Role of the Dissenting Landowner, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 633, 669 (2018).
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Martin, supra note 92, at 3-27 (citing Gant v. Oklahoma City, 6 P. 2d 1065 (Okla. 1931), aff’d, 289 U.S.
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authority of cities to establish drilling blocks or to impose conditions on development have reached
disparate results. Courts sometimes invalidate city actions,234 at other times uphold them,235 and
occasionally attempt to harmonize the two.236 Courts have consistently emphasized the important
role of local governments’ use of traditional zoning authority to regulate land use to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens and the interests of communities in which oil and gas
development occurs.237 Frequently, however, these delegations of authority are overlapping and
not exclusive, and might interfere or conflict with state delegations of authority to conservation
agencies, thus leading to confusion about the extent of local government authority to regulate oil
and gas activities.238 In those cases, states have largely been successful in bringing preemption
challenges against local ordinances that attempt to outright ban drilling or hydraulic fracturing.239
As a result, cities and counties have found themselves limited from regulating much of the oil and
gas development within their domain.240 Thus, effective use of administrative processes to raise
environmental concerns may become increasingly necessary where the city has the standing to do
so.
2. Matters of Process
Conservation agencies may also be subject to state procedural statutes requiring
consideration of environmental impacts. As of 2006 at least sixteen states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico have some version of procedural environmental acts, although the
substantive effect, the threshold tests for when a full environmental review is needed, and the
provisions for judicial review differ among them.241In New York, the State Environmental Quality
Review Act (“SEQRA”), has also be applied to the decisions of its state conservation agency, the
Bureau of Oil and Gas Permitting and Management, part of the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation.242 In California, the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA)243 applies to decisions of the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR).
CEQA provides that “it is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the state government
234

Id. at 3-28 (citing Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Larkins, 31 P.2d 608 (Okla. 1934)).

235

Id. at 3-29, 3-31 (citing Unger v. State, 629 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982); Klepak v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 177 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1944)).
236
Id. at 3-30 to 3-31 (citing Oborne v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Douglas Cnty., No. 84CV109 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. July 25, 1985)).
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REV. 201, 203, 207–09 (2006); Ritchie, supra note 190, at 271–72.
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See, e.g., City of Fort Collins v. Colorado Oil, 369 P.3d 586 (2016); City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas
Ass'n, 2016 CO 29, 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016); Robertson, supra note 151, at 111–12; Ritchie, supra note 190, at
257–58.
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which regulate activities of private individuals, corporations, and public agencies which are found
to affect the quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration
is given to preventing environmental damage, while providing a decent home and satisfying living
environment for every Californian.”244 Like NEPA, state environmental procedure acts require
state agencies to consider the environmental effects of proposed project and to consider options to
mitigate or avoid significant impacts.245 Litigants have challenged the adequacy of these
environmental analyses in the context of hydraulic fracturing and the issuance of well permits246
Thus, a state environmental procedure act may impact conservation proceedings by requiring
costly and timely preparation of environmental impact reports247 and providing opportunities for
judicial review.
3. Matters of Rights
Environmental advocates in Pennsylvania are challenging agency decisions relative to oil
and gas on the basis that they violate the citizens’ constitutionally protected rights to a clean
environment and abrogate the state’s duties with respect to public trust resources. These efforts
have realized some success regarding oil and gas leasing and development on state land and
provide a new avenue for judicial challenges to agency decisions regarding oil and gas activities
on private land.
In the early 1970’s, during the birth of the environmental law movement, Pennsylvania
voters amended their constitution to provide additional protections for the environment and natural
resources. Article 1, Sec. 27 provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.248
This provision incorporates a modern version of the public trust doctrine into the state
constitutions, granting citizens an “inalienable” right to a clean environment.249 As such, it
operates as a powerful limitation on state actions that “would infringe upon such rights”250 and
244
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2015), available at http://www.co.kern.ca.us/planning/pdfs/eirs/oil_gas/oil_gas_NOD_final.pdf.
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permits legal challenges on the basis that “the government has failed in its trustee obligations.”251
While not intended to be “read in absolutist terms so as to prohibit development,” the ERA requires
policy makers to consider conflicting environmental and social concerns.252 While this provision
had been viewed as a merely “aspirational” statement, 253 litigants in Pennsylvania have recently
rejuvenated the ERA. 254
The Environmental Rights amendment experienced a renaissance following the successful
challenge of a 2012 state law that attempted to expressly preempt all local regulation of oil and
gas. Pennsylvania, like many states,255 sought to clarify the division of authority between
conservation agencies and municipalities and preempt local regulation of oil and gas operations
with the passage of Act 13 of 2012 (Act 13).256 Act 13 was designed to promote uniformity of
regulation across the state, including imposing uniform setback and zoning requirements, by
replacing the state’s 1984 Oil and Gas Act with a statutory framework.257 In so doing, the
legislature “attempted to entirely foreclose the ability of municipalities to afford their residents
environmental protections, via the enactment of any zoning ordinances tailored to address unique
local environmental needs and conditions, whenever those ordinances ‘might be perceived as
affecting oil and gas operations.’”258 In March 2012, municipalities and individuals challenged the
constitutionality of Act 13 claiming that it violated the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA)
of the Pennsylvania Constitution.259 The court in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth (Robinson
II) affirmed the standing of a municipality in a legal action to enforce environmental standards and
overturned several provisions of Act 13 on the basis that they violated deprived municipalities of
their constitutional authority to conserve and maintain public natural resources.260
Subsequent litigation regarding the ERA has affirmed the state’s public trust duties
regarding protection of the environment and the disposition of public natural resources. In
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF) the Commonwealth
Court found that the DCNR’s decision to lease state property within the public trust implicated
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“constitutional rights and duties” and was an “appropriate subject of judicial scrutiny.”261 On
appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enforced the duty of the State to protect the environment
and serve as a trustee, rather than as a proprietor, of its “public natural resources.”262 Following
PEDF, the Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) has considered the extent of the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection’s trustee obligations with respect to public natural
resources. Thus far, it has not operated as a prohibition on development. In a recent case involving
permit renewals, the EHB stated, “[o]ur understanding of the trustee responsibility does not require
the Department to deny permits to any and all activity that will negatively impact the public natural
resources and/or the people who use those resources,” and that “[t]o hold otherwise would
essentially prevent any permitting activity since it is nigh impossible to have development without
some environmental impact.”263 Consistent with the early balancing tests,264 the Board found it in
ERA challenges to permit actions it must assess whether the agency considered the environmental
effects of their permitting actions and correctly concluded that those actions would not cause an
unreasonable degradation to the environment.265
The extent of the state’s constitutional obligation to protect environmental values in
decisions related to private land is unclear.266 In PEDF, the DCNR acted relative to state-owned
land, part of the public trust created by Section 27; thus, the ERA was found to be self-executing
as to the Commonwealth’s trustee obligations.267 The amendment’s first clause, creating an
individual right to a clean environment, creates no similar obligation on a government authority to
“conserve and maintain.” Based on several early cases, the individual rights clause of the
amendment has long been viewed as requiring implementing legislation to authorize the state to
enforce the people’s rights against owners of private property.268 Agencies have not substantially
changed their permitting processes or fact finding in response to Robinson or PEDF. However, the
decisions in Robinson and PEDF have emboldened individuals and municipalities to challenge oil
and gas and other industrial permitting activities and created a pathway by which these groups can
challenge agency actions in which they were previously not considered interested parties.269 While
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The Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) has begun to consider how the ERA applies to
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) decisions on private lands. See, Center for Coalfield
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constitutional arguments thus far have not resulted in widespread reversals, cases brought to date
concerning Section 27 indicate the numerous effects that environmental rights provisions270 may
have on state law.
Whereas Pennsylvania is unique in its creation of a constitutional public trust, many states
recognize their citizens’ rights to a clean environment and acknowledge public trust principles
either through state statute, the constitution, or common law.271 For example, Article 9, Section 1
of the 1974 Montana constitution provides that “[t]he state and each person shall maintain and
improve a clean and healthful environment” and “[t]he legislature shall provide adequate remedies
for the protection of the environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate
remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.” This has been
found not merely to be an aspirational statement, but to create an inalienable right to a clean
environment.272 Environmental Rights Statutes in Michigan and Minnesota expressly grant any
“private party, state, or local government the right to sue for declaratory or injunctive relief to
protect air, water, land or other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction.”273
In Minnesota, this statute has been used to protect natural resources beyond what is already
mandated by state law and to enjoin development activities that would adversely impact protected
natural resources.274 As such, these statutes and constitutional protections may form the basis for
additional fact finding and environmental protection obligations on state oil and gas conservation
agencies, and may prove significant in determining the outcome of state-local conflicts regarding
oil and gas development.275
The impacts of these efforts should not be dismissed or diminished. True: these efforts have
not resulted in a sea change at oil and gas conservation agencies. Only one ballot initiative –
Florida’s Constitutional Amendment 9 – passed, and it related only to areas that had already been
statutorily off limits to drilling. Courts continue to extend a high standard of deference to
conservation agency decisions regarding permits and rulemaking. The Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed the COGCC’s decision not to initiate rulemaking, and thus far the ERA and state
environmental procedure acts have not resulted in blanket reversals of permitting decisions on
H’rg Bd., No. 2295 CD 2015 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 3, 2018); Clean Air Council et al. v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P. (Pa.
Cmwlth Ct. Dkt. No. 1112 C.D. 2017, April 30, 2018).
270
In the absence of constitutional provisions creating a public trust, attempts to expand a common law public
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private land. Collectively, however, these efforts are bringing questions about the nature of waste
into the forefront. The concerns of landowners and municipalities are coming before courts and
have the potential to reshape conservation law. And, perhaps more importantly, governors and
state legislatures are listening.
IV.

AMENDING AGENCY AUTHORITY

Elected politicians have considerable power to influence the political responsiveness of oil
and gas conservation agencies through actual or proposed changes to the agency’s enabling
legislation or through executive requests for rulemaking and the choice of political appointees. Oil
and gas conservation agencies are not structurally independent.276 Nearly all of the members of oil
and gas regulatory agencies are appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by the state
senate, and can be removed by the governor at any time.277 As a result, commissioners may be
chosen not only for their technical competence and ability to make “dispassionate professional
judgments” about reservoir characteristics, but also for their political judgment.278 This
dependence may account for the responsiveness that conservation agencies show to political
directives.
Although many agencies are permitted to act independently despite executive
instruction,279 oil and gas conservation agencies have undertaken rulemaking on specific subject
matter related to health and environment, such as hydraulic fracturing or flowline rules, after
receiving instruction from state governors. For instance, in 2013 Wyoming Governor Matt Mead
directed the WOGCC to initiate rulemaking for the adoption of a baseline water quality testing
rule in areas of oil and gas drilling to establish a dataset of groundwater condition in areas of active
drilling.280 In Colorado, the COGCC has at times received heavy-handed instruction from its
gubernatorial offices, too. In 2014, Governor Hickenlooper convened an oil and gas development
task force to improve local government involvement in permitting and other Commission
decisions.281 Following the 2017 explosion of underground flowlines in a Firestone, Colorado
neighborhood, Governor Hickenlooper further directed the COGCC to conduct a comprehensive
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review of oil and gas regulations statewide.282 While these policies are largely lauded as increasing
environmental protection by states, the executive branch also may wield its position to dissuade
conservation agencies from taking certain action.
Pressures for increased consideration of environmental and climate impacts have not gone
unnoticed by legislatures. In response to local government action, citizen initiatives, conservation
agency decisions and rulemakings, and litigation, state legislatures nationwide are considering new
laws to clarify agency authority or to address specific environmental issues that have been brought
before conservation agencies. These actions include proposals to amend agency authority or the
composition of commissions to include experts on air quality and climate,283 and to modify state
oil and gas conservation acts to harmonize with the changing economy and value systems of its
citizens. These changes have been instrumental in providing commissions with authority regarding
environmental issues and protection of public resources. In fact, while not fundamentally altering
the scope of conservation commissions or the deference afforded to agency’s technical
determinations, these changes were precisely what provided environmental constituencies with
statutory basis to argue for greater consideration of environmental impacts in Simmers, Martinez,
and PDEF.
Colorado provides an illustrative case study in the evolution of oil and gas conservation
law. The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act was first passed in 1951 to establish the Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission and to “define and prohibit the waste of oil and gas in Colorado284
and “ to provide for the responsible development of the state’s oil and gas resources,”285 with an
emphasis on increased production.286 Shortly thereafter the Act was amended to provide to declare
that the policy goal of the conservation law as to “foster, encourage and promote the development,
production and utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas in the state of Colorado.”287 These
purposes gradually shifted towards an increased focus on environmental, health, and safety
concerns. The act was amended three more times in 1985, 1994, and 2007, each relative to the
protection of health, safety, public welfare and the environment.288 As a result, the Colorado Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) has the authority to regulate oil and gas operations
“so as to prevent and mitigate significant adverse environmental impacts on any air, water, soil, or
282
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biological resource . . . . to the extent necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare,
including protection of the environment and wildlife resources.”289
Pennsylvania similarly amended its conservation act to respond to environmental concerns
and to account for technological developments including horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing. Pennsylvania’s 1984 Oil and Gas Act governed the industry until 2012 when a
proliferation of shale drilling in the Marcellus and local government regulation promoted passage
of Act 13. Act 13 sought to protect public resources such as schools and parks, and also to preempt
local regulation of oil and gas.290 Although several portions of Act 13 relative to preemption have
been challenged and overturned, it substantially changed the authority of the oil and gas
conservation agency to regulate oil and gas and required new procedures for the Department to
consider the protection of public resources in the well permitting process.291
Adoption of broad policy positions supporting public health, safety, and welfare have been
critical to providing conservation agencies with the authority to promulgate rules for the regulation
hydraulic fracturing, to require setbacks from occupied structures, and to respond quickly to new
safety concerns including flowlines and idle and abandoned wells. However, they have not
radically shifted the role of oil and gas conservation commissions away from promoting and
encouraging the efficient regulation of oil and gas operations or a redefining of waste according to
21st century environmental norms. For example, the Supreme Court of Colorado in Martinez v.
OGCC, found that Colorado’s amendments to its oil and gas conservation act evidence an “intent
to prevent and mitigate significant adverse environmental impacts… but only after taking into
consideration cost-effectiveness and technical feasibility.” Contrary to the petitioner’s arguments,
the court found that the amendments do not create “a check on oil and gas development,” “a
balancing test,” or condition “further oil and gas development on a finding of no cumulative
adverse impacts to public health or the environment.”
Legislatures are accustomed and well positioned to respond to environmental concerns
related to oil and gas development. Legislatures are required to make difficult decisions regarding
the balance between the strong and often divisive public interests when considering the efficient
development of oil and gas resources, the protection of the environment, and the impacts to surface
owners. These decisions require consideration of both positive and negative impacts of oil and gas
development on the economy, including jobs, education, and public services, and on the quality of
life of their constituents. A redefining of waste to include environmental harms or impacts to
climate, for example, would have significant impacts on established property interests and
contracts. Thus, these are precisely the types of considerations legislatures, rather than courts,
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agencies, or special interest groups, are best equipped to address. Advocates for more radical
changes to conservation regulation have petitioned lawmakers or introduced legislation to require
conservation regulators to prioritize consideration of environmental impacts and to diminish the
influence of industry voices.292 Thus far, however, these efforts have proven unsuccessful.293
However, the introduction and discussion of bills regarding consideration of environmental
impacts and the proper role of oil and gas conservation agencies is encouraging. Together with
reasonable local regulation of traditional land use concerns and enforcement of existing
environmental laws, legislatures can provide for the efficient and responsible development of oil
and gas in light of the changing technologies, development methodologies, and impacts to the
environment.
V.

AN INCIDENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY

Oil and Gas conservation agencies have played an inadvertent role in limiting the
environmental impacts of oil and gas production. The drilling of unnecessary wells needlessly
destroys surface resources.294 Each well pad requires clearing of brush and grading, development
of roads and drilling pits, and may include waste water impoundment, trenching for flow lines,
and construction of production facilities.295 These well sites can range from two to twenty acres of
“non-habitat” with impacts to ecosystems that extend beyond the drill site itself.296 These facilities
can contribute to erosion, introduction of noxious weeds, and can adversely impact wildlife habitat
and migration.297 Further, the site construction and drilling and completion processes themselves
require large energy and water inputs. Finally, abandoned and unplugged wells can pose significant
environmental risks by acting as conduits between fresh water sources and deeper hydrocarbon
bearing reservoirs.298 These impacts are limited by oil and gas conservation regulations prohibit
development in areas smaller than can be reasonably drained by one well.299 Although the intent
292
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of those rules is to prevent waste, they also limit the number of well sites, wells drilled, and surface
disturbances.300 Further, rules to limit venting and flaring in order to prevent waste have
significantly limited the volumes of greenhouse gasses such as methane and carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere. While it is not possible to fully eliminate the surface environmental impacts of oil
and gas development, conservation regulation has been a driver in the movement to limit
environmental impacts of oil and gas development.301 These impacts however are incidental to the
advancement of conservation law purposes: conservation agencies have not historically been
considered environmental agencies, and the focus of conservation law has been on encouraging
efficient production and maximizing the utility of the resources, not on the preservation of
ecosystems, beauty, or a stable climate.
Although conservation agencies are alluring targets given their role in permitting, efforts
to task them with widespread protection of the environment and to condition oil and gas permitting
on no-impact findings are misguided. First the purposes of conservation statutes and environmental
statutes conflict, and choosing between those inapposite ends would require agencies to exercise
discretion and engage in non-technical public policy more appropriately reserved by the
legislature. Second, oil and gas conservation agencies are vulnerable to agency capture. Third,
conservation agencies, as presently constituted, lack the technical expertise to make fact findings
that environmental mandates could require. Finally, pushing oil and gas conservation agencies into
the role of an environmental regulator is unlikely to result in landscape and climate scale changes
that advocates desire.
Environmental protection is not the primary goal of oil and gas conservation regulation
and, at times, may conflict with the stated purposes of oil and gas conservation statutes.302 Oil and
gas conservation agencies are tasked with promoting the efficient development of hydrocarbon
resources for the purpose of maximizing the total amount of production and protecting the rights
of other mineral owners in the field. Although these purposes have expanded to include protection
of groundwater and management of oil and gas wastes, typically a secondary state agency, such as
the department of environmental quality, has primacy over state programs to regulate air or
water.303 This segregation is logical. The Clean Water Act, for example, was enacted to “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”304 Those
purposes may at times be in conflict with the purposes underpinning conservation law, thus
requiring a reconciliation of opposites.
Principles of environmental law and conservation law may be unreconcilable. Although
asking agencies to advance conflicting policy choices and find a “win-win” solution is appealing,
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at times policy choices between development and the environment will create winners and
losers.305 Environmental law by its very nature imposes costs and benefits on various stake
holders.306 In contrast to the concept of co-equal and correlative rights, which seeks to protect
each owner’s rights to produce his just and equitable share of the resource, environmental law “is
purposely and necessarily redistributive in a manner antagonistic to some private property
interests.”307 For example, a well that, from an engineering and geologic standpoint, is necessary
to drain a portion of the reservoir may pose environmental risks. Whereas the prevention of waste
and protection of correlative rights would dictate that the well was drilled, environmental law,
through the imposition of additional costs or a prohibition on drilling, would make drilling
infeasible. As such, the prevention of waste may be incompatible with the protection of
environmental interests in air and water particularly as environmental interests are increasingly
interpreted to include interests in esthetics, the atmosphere, and a stable climate. Agencies have
high value in making the complex technical determinations necessary to the administration of
current oil and gas conservation law, but are should not be involved in more subjective
determinations such as the comparative public values in oil and gas production and the
environment. Requiring conservation agencies to choose between these public purposes would
overwhelm current permitting processes with a flood of challenges that would, in turn, result in
litigation over agency decisions, thus pushing political questions regarding the appropriate balance
between production and protection before courts.
Oil and gas conservation agencies may also be less effective at regulating for
environmental impacts due to the potential for capture of the agency. It is well documented that
regulatory agencies may be disproportionate influenced by the industries they are supposed to be
regulating such that they become more responsive to the desires of industry than the public.308
Capture can result due to heavy involvement of the affected industries in the development of
regulations,309 partisan appointments, and the likelihood that, given the expertise required to make
technical determinations within the industry, agency officials may have previously worked in
industry and likely plan on returning to those jobs.310 Consolidating environmental regulatory
functions within oil and gas conservation agencies may amplify the effects of industry influence
in ways that requiring coordination between separate regulatory and conservation agencies would
not.
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Until recently, concerns of agency capture were rarely raised with respect to oil and gas
conservation commissions. The statutory public purposes for which conservation commissions
have historically regulated the industry are not in direct opposition industry interests. For the most
part, the industry supports reasonable regulation to encourage efficient production, protect
correlative rights, and limit drainage. However, as conservation agencies have taken on
responsibility for environmental inspections and regulation of hydraulic fracturing, concerns
relative to undue influence by the industry have heightened.311 Environmental laws have
significant impacts on oil and gas development and private property rights that may be in direct
conflict with industry interests. Agency capture has been cited among the contributors to the EPA’s
determination that further study of hydraulic fracturing was unwarranted,312 and the BP horizon
tragedy in the gulf.313 In fact, agency capture was among the principal reasons that following the
gulf oil spill the Mineral Management Service was reorganized into two separate agencies – one
with responsibilities for managing revenue and the other with responsibility for making inspections
and assuring compliance.314 Charging conservation agencies with environmental regulation of the
industry risks creating the exact situation advocates have been working to undo in the banking
industry and offshore.
Due to their different focus, oil and gas conservation agencies also lack the technical
capability and expertise to make the necessary fact-findings environmental mandates would
require. One of the chief benefits of legislative delegation to agencies is that agencies can develop
the highly specialized expertise necessary to complete the fact-finding necessary to make decisions
regarding drilling and permitting in the public interest. Oil and gas conservation commissions are
usually staffed with experts in law, geology, engineering, and land.315 These disciplines are chosen
based on the ability of specialists within them to make determinations relative to the prevention of
waste and protection of correlative rights. However, these specialties may not provide the requisite
expertise to make findings relative to wildlife, or cumulative impacts such as those related to
climate change.316 In the absence of structural and legal changes, conservation agencies may not
have the authority, procedures, or expertise necessary to gather information and require and
monitor mitigation for landscape-scale impacts. Further, a fundamental reordering of conservation
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agencies may diminish their technical capacity and expertise to make the fact findings necessary
to preventing geologic waste and protecting correlative rights.
Despite these concerns, as the gatekeeper to drilling, conservation commissions can play
an important role in verifying compliance with environmental protections as a condition to
receiving administrative authority to drill. For example, prior to granting an APD, agencies are
appropriately tasked with verifying compliance with setback regulations, split estate acts, and
habitat barriers and seasonal drilling restrictions such as those incorporated into the Greater Sage
Grouse Management Plan. By assuring that companies have appropriate plans for gas capture and
pipeline infrastructure prior to drilling, agencies may be able to limit venting and flaring. Agencies
also verify compliance with integrity management rules for flowlines and crude oil transfers and
employ inspectors to assure proper plugging of inactive wells. These determinations buttress
comprehensive environmental regulations but do not require discretion relative to conflicting
public policy goals nor technical capacity beyond the agencies expertise to measure compliance.
This suggests that, provided there is a proper hierarchy between the agency’s statutory purpose, a
nuanced approach to regulation by commissions can advance the dual purposes of environmental
protection and conservation.
There are unrealized opportunities to prevent waste and limit harm to the environment
through more targeted commission regulation and liberal conservation strategies. Exploratory
unitization would reduce environmental impacts by maximizing recovery from the minimum
number of wells.317 Current well spacing rules are based on a fiction that all reservoirs are
homogeneous and drain radially.318 In contrast, unitization seeks to consolidate mineral interests
across the reservoir such that production can be carried out in the most efficient manner based on
geology and the maintenance of reservoir pressure, without regards to competition, lease lines, or
individual well regulations.319 This may increase total recovery – thus minimizing waste – and
address the issues while reducing environmental impacts and conflicts with surface owners.320 For
example, unitization would protect the correlative rights of owners who were restricted from
drilling on their individual parcels because of species or water issues; under an area-wide unit
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agreement they would still share in production. Further, by determining operatorship of the unit
up front, exploratory unitization has the potential to curb the “permit wars” that are presently
underway in Colorado and Wyoming and which are overwhelming commissions.321
These efforts would require legislative action. A majority of state oil and gas conservation
commissions do not have statutory authority to force non-consenting owners into exploratory units.
The 2004 amendments of the Interstate Oil & Gas Commission model form Oil and Gas
Conservation Act included an express provision for exploratory unitization.322 State conservation
agencies would oversee this process to assure that the plan is feasible and results in additional
recovery and that the proposed allocation formula is fair to all unit owners.323 However, many state
agencies have not adopted the 2004 model act. Thus, although exploratory unitization has long
been used to aid in conservation on federal lands, absent voluntary agreement of the parties,
conservation agencies may not have the authority to compel early unitization.324 Appropriate
legislative authorizations can thus enable conservation agencies to enhance environmental
protections within the scope of their statutorily delegated purposes and consistent with the
agency’s expertise and familiarity with the technical operation of the industry.
Legislatures can also address concerns related to industry or political influence and agency
dependence through structural changes. For example, encouraging bi-partisan appointments and
insulating commissioners from removal for reasons other than cause would insulate agencies from
short term electoral interests. Similarly, separating agency funding from drilling permit fees,
requiring consultation, or implementing employment restrictions are also cited as “equalizing
factors.”325 In so doing however, legislatures should consider the balance between structural
independence and preventing undue influence carefully. For instance, consultation requirements
have been cited as an effective tool to limit or increase industry influence,326 but also as procedural
change to reduce agency autonomy.327 By requiring an agency to consult with local governments
or an advocacy group, for example, legislatures can incorporate processes that assure that
environmental voices are given greater concern but may also interfere with independence when
the agencies independent judgement conflicts with that of consulting interests. Employment
restrictions may decrease industry and political influences, but also diminish the technical efficacy
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and expertise of the agency. Conversely, employment qualifications requiring substantial
experience within the regulated industry almost guarantee influence from industry perspectives.
This is not to suggest that environmental regulation of the oil and gas industry is not
necessary or should be subordinated to principals of conservation law. When properly applied by
other agencies, environmental laws play an important role in determining where and how oil and
gas should be produced. It should by now be evident that oil and gas operators will need to be
aware of multiple stakeholder interests and that a purely capture-based system of legal entitlements
cannot survive. Even so, only so much can be accomplished through legislative or voter-initiated
revisions to commission authority. These efforts are a clunky substitute for actual legislation
addressing climate impacts or greenhouse gas emissions on a national scale. Any commission
authority will be inherently limited to a subset of one very narrow scope of activities on one type
of property, and only as to new development or development requesting additional agency action.
Producing wells will largely be unaffected by new regulations, as will contributions to climate
from other industries engaged in surface land development. Thus, initiatives that incorporate
subsidies for environmentally friendly development practices, create tradable mitigation credits,
or otherwise use market mechanisms to encourage low-carbon and sustainable energy
development practices328 may be more effective than efforts aimed at impacting the oil and gas
permitting stage.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Oil and gas conservation agencies have been instrumental in limiting waste and
environmental externalities from oil and gas production activities through prohibitions on wild
wells, well spacing regulations, and compulsory pooling.329 However, for most of its history,
environmental protection has been an incidental benefit of conservation law rather than its
underlying purpose. Instead, the oil and gas conservation statutes “in every state operate on a
capture-based property model” that tacitly accepts environmental degradation and environmental
drilling as normative.330 This model prioritizes the prevention of waste and the protection of each
individual’s right to capture his share of the minerals.
After more than sesquicentennial since the first oil and gas regulations, environmental
constituencies and landowners are questioning the primacy of capture-based paradigms.
Concerned citizens, including surface owners and conservation and environmental groups, have
pushed conservation commissions and legislatures to revise oil and gas conservation statutes to
include provisions addressing surface impacts, requiring consideration of impacts to air quality,
wildlife, and the environment, modifying common law dominance of the minerals within split
estates, and establishing setbacks from residences, schools, streams, parks, and hospitals. The
traditional hierarchy whereby the prevention of waste is paramount to all other public concerns is
undeniably changing.
328
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In recent years there has been an increase in environmental activism in administrative
proceedings before oil and gas conservation agencies. Environmental groups have used citizen
petitions and environmental review provisions of procedural statutes to open up conservation
agencies and push for greater democratization of oil and gas regulation. As a result, conservation
agencies have been forced to reconcile structural conflicts between broad aspirational directives
of protecting health, safety, and public welfare, with specific and historically-entrenched mandates
of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights. These proceedings have rarely overcome
agency inertia, instead leading to activism in the courts, at the ballot box, and before the legislature.
create standing for environmental advocates in agency proceedings. Limited success in those
arenas have created standing for environmental advocates, pushed agencies to initiate rulemaking
proceedings, and created new precedents by which agencies can afford greater consideration for
environmental impacts. The result is that oil and gas regulators have emerged as inadvertent, and
often reluctant, environmental agencies.
Legislatures and environmental constituencies can accomplish a better balance between
efficient development and environmental protection. These means may include refinements of
state oil and gas conservation statutes for spacing and pooling, and adoption of correlative-rights
based laws authorizing commissions to engage in early stage exploratory unitization. These
changes have the potential to expand the power of agencies to consider and mitigate environmental
impacts, while actually increasing total reservoir recoveries and preserving the correlative rights
of mineral owners. Further, enactment or expansion of state environmental or administrative
procedure acts can increase environmental considerations in administrative proceedings and
provide standing to more diverse groups to challenge agency rulings.
Changes to oil and gas conservation laws should be made judiciously. Legislatures should
be wary of amending oil and gas conservation acts in a manner that requires agencies to exercise
discernment between conflicting and co-equal policy goals. Without a clear hierarchy and
guidance regarding the factors the agency are required to consider and the relative weights between
them, these mandates may lead to disparate results and an increase in litigation regarding agency
discretion. Expanded authority requires a corresponding expansion in expertise. Thus, legislatures
should assure that agency composition assures that the agency has sufficient expertise to engage
in fact finding relative to environmental factors and to mitigate the risk of undue industry influence.
Legislatures should be aware that these changes may result in increased opposition to
administrative proceedings and require conservation agencies to manage complex evidentiary and
procedural issues. These changes may diminish the important role conservation agencies have
historically played in making technical determinations regarding waste and correlative rights. By
tasking conservation agencies with the dual and paradoxical purpose of both encouraging
production and preventing and regulating environmental impacts of development, it is possible
that neither will be achieved.
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